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FEAR AND LOATHING: COMBATING SPECULATION
IN LOCAL COMMUNITIES
Ngai Pindell*
Local governments commonly respond to economic and social pressures on property
by using their legal power to regulate land uses. These local entities enact regula-
tions that limit property development and use to maintain attractive communities
and orderly growth. This Article argues that government entities should employ
their expansive land use powers to limit investor speculation in local markets by
restricting the resale of residential housing for three years. Investor speculation,
and the upward pressure it places on housing prices, threatens the availability of
affordable housing as well as the development of stable neighborhoods. Govern-
ment regulation of investor speculation mirrors existing, privately imposed
restrictions that prevent individual purchasers from appropriating property value
that rightfully belongs to surrounding neighbors. This progressive allocation of prop-
erty value is supported by earlier urban theorists like Henry George and Ebenezer
Howard, and is consistent with modern land use legal decisions and policy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent activity in the residential housing market has moved
property discussions from law school classrooms to newspapers and
internet chat rooms. Within the last couple of years, countless
articles have discussed rising housing prices,' the availability of af-
fordable housing,2 low interest rates,3 increasing access to creative
home finance products,4 and speculative purchases by investors
* Associate Professor, Boyd School of Law at University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Thanks
go to Annette Appell, Joan Howarth and Scott Cummings for their comments. I received
excellent research assistance from Lauren Calvert and Eva Segerblom. I am also grateful to
Kristen Boike and the editors of the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform for their
exceptional editing.
1. See, e.g., Jennifer Bayot, April Sales of New Homes Show a Surge, N.Y. TIMEs, May 26,
2005, at C3 (discussing record housing price increases reported by the National Association
of Realtors).
2. See, e.g., David Leonhardt & Motoko Rich, Twenty Years Later, Buying a House Is Less
of a Bite, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2005, at Al (comparing housing affordability among different
cities and regions of the country).
3. See, e.g., Nancy Sarnoff, A Place of Their Own, HOUSTON CHRON., June 26, 2005, at
Business 1 ("Experts said low interest rates and the lure of homeownership are causing this
group [those born between 1977 and 1994] to buy homes earlier than their baby boomer
parents and Generation X.").
4. See, e.g., Dean Foust, Housing the Mortgage Trap, Bus. WK., June 27, 2005, at 32,
34 ("[N]othing screams 'frenzy' louder than the huge popularity of innovative-and
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who believe housing values will continue to rise. 5 Economists, rec-
ognizing these same trends, ponder how long increasing real estate
prices will last,6 how the national economy would react to falling
real estate prices,7 and which local housing markets are ripe for
housing value free falls or long-term appreciation.8
Musings over housing price appreciation and fears of speculative
bubbles in 2004 and most of 2005 yielded to discussions of rising
interest rates and cooling housing markets in 2006.' The rise and
fall of housing markets is not a new phenomenon, but the effects
of housing frenzies and slowdowns merit examination under local
governments' power to regulate land use. Historically, these hous-
ing market vacillations were left to the private market to address.
In the future, local governments could consider legislation to stem
pernicious effects of rapid housing price appreciation on orderly
land use planning, affordable housing development, and the avail-
ability of housing opportunities for families and local employees.
Runaway housing prices in residential real estate markets raise
important questions concerning local regulation of property. As
prices rise, housing within the nation's cities becomes increasingly
out of reach for those who live and work in those cities. For exam-
ple, a 2002 study in Las Vegas, Nevada concluded that for each
incremental $1000 rise in housing prices in Clark County, Nevada,
risky-mortgage products that allow buyers to stretch for those million-dollar studios and
multimillion-dollar suburban colonials .... [S]uch loans now account for 20% of all new
mortgages, up from under 5% two years ago."). One of these products, the option adjust-
able rate mortgage (ARM), allows a purchaser to choose each month to make an interest-
only payment, an amortizing payment (interest plus principal), or a minimum payment that
can be lower than the monthly interest amount.
5. See, e.g., Virginia Heffernan, For Armchair Fippers, Speculation as Spectator Sport, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 4, 2005, at Fl.
6. See generally ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE PART Two (Princeton
Univ. Press 2005) (2001) (discussing the residential real estate bubble and drawing compari-
sons to the stock market bubble at the beginning of the decade); Daryl Kelley, Housing May
Be Fillmore's Biggest Cash Cp, LA. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2005, at BI (discussing impact of federal
budget on economic markets and mortgage rates).
7. See, e.g., Anna Bernasek, Hear a Pop? Watch Out, N.Y. Times, May 29, 2005, § 3, at 6
("Adding it all up, it's easy to see how a drop in real estate prices would spell trouble for the
economy.... Reviewing the experience in the United States and 13 other industrialized
countries, the I.M.E [International Monetary Fund] found that a real estate bust is far more
dangerous to the economy than a stock market bust.").
8. See, e.g., Matthew Haggman, Lennar Builds Sturdy Profits, MIAMI HERALD, June 22,
2005, at IC (stating that high employment rates and increasing incomes in Miami, Florida
will mitigate a housing value downturn); Shawn Tully, Is It Time to Cash Out?, FORTUNE, July
11, 2005, at 54 (discussing the most overpriced and underpriced housing markets in the
country).
9. See, e.g., Tomoeh Murakami Tse, New-Home Sales Fell in Feb.; Inventories Rose to New
Record, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2006, at DOI (describing declines in the pace of housing sales
and the price of housing, and an increasing number of houses waiting to be sold).
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1,528 families were unable to purchase a home."° From 2000 to
2002, the median sales price of homes climbed $55,000 without a
corresponding increase in incomes, meaning approximately 84,000
additional families were unable to purchase homes."
The first part of the title of this Article, "fear and loathing," con-
jures images of Las Vegas'--one site of speculative investment and
a rapidly appreciating real estate market. But more than that, "fear
and loathing" represents two aspects of the typical response to
speculation. Taking the words in reverse order, "loathing" reflects
the many negative perceptions of the effects of property specula-
tion.13 In particular, speculators are often blamed for the inability
of local residents to attain affordable housing. In one instance, a
local resident who had been outbid by an investor ran crying from
the home she had hoped to purchase. Investors are often aware of
this effect on affordable housing:
[The investor in this instance] said she is uncomfortable
choosing between guilt and easy investment profits. Still, she
is considering buying a fifth home here. "I can't say, 'Oh,
those Californians,' and then say, 'Don't point at me,' because
that's hypocritical," she said. "Do I consider myself one of the
people ruining it? Realistically, yes, I'm personally responsible
for home prices rising there."'4
Regarding fear, local governments are generally afraid to aggres-
sively address housing speculation for several reasons: (1) the risk
of courts striking down innovative efforts, (2) the possibility of po-
litical repercussions for appearing not to value individual property
rights, (3) the costs of interfering with investment capital inflow
into a community that, at least for the short term, will likely raise
overall property values and, consequently, property tax revenue,15
10. J.M. Kalil, Hot Market: Chasing the Dream, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Aug. 1, 2004, at 23A.
11. Id.
12. See HUNTER S. THOMPSON, FEAR AND LOATIHING IN LAS VEGAS: A SAVAGE JOURNEY
TO THE HEART OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (1971).
13. To say that most people "loathe" speculators seems a bit of a hyperbole, but given
the quantity of discussions in internet sites as well as in the print and television media over
the pernicious effects of speculators, perhaps "loathe" is an apt word. Certainly the title of
one article supports this contention. Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation
and Private Ordering in the Marketfor OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701 (1999).
14. J.M. Kalil, California Investor Calls Valley Market an "Interesting Ride, "LAS VEGAS REV.-
J., Aug. 2, 2004, at 8A.
15. Addressing affordability concerns through regulation might also create additional
affordability burdens. Some critiques of affordable housing programs argue that excessive land
use regulation often contributes to higher housing prices due to higher costs of compliance.
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and (4) the difficulty in isolating speculative investment from other
forms of investment and also from other causes of rising housing
prices such as low interest rates or the overall supply of housing.
6
This Article addresses the above justifications for local govern-
ments' relative inaction against speculation by exploring the
development of an anti-speculation measure applicable to residen-
tial property. This anti-speculation measure could be a zoning
district designation containing anti-speculation requirements in ad-
dition to the more traditional requirements of permissible densities,
housing types and the like. Local governments could also incorpo-
rate anti-speculation measures into an overlay zoning district. 7 This
Article considers the implementation of anti-speculation measures
within a legislatively enacted "anti-speculation ordinance."'
The core of the proposed anti-speculation zoning ordinance is a
requirement that first purchasers of residential property in newly
constructed developments of a certain size be restricted in their
ability to sell the property for three years.' 9 Anti-speculation meas-
ures ideally would be implemented in medium and large-scale
communities of approximately twenty or more units. The ordi-
nance would apply to both attached and detached single-family
housing.0
A three-year resale limitation period is long enough to discour-
age speculative purchases and flipping, but not so long as to curb
significant numbers of people intending to employ a "buy and
See, e.g., Michael H. Schill, Privatizing Federal Low Income Housing Assistance: The Case of Public
Housing, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 878, 891-99 (1990).
16. Significant housing appreciation also can be caused by housing purchases influ-
enced by long-term goals like education quality. See Jasper Kim, Anti-Speculation Laws and
Their Impact on the Real Estate and Financial Markets: The Korean Case, 18 COLUM.J. ASIAN L. 47,
52 (2004).
17. For a description of overlay zoning, see MORTON GITELMAN ET AL., LAND USE,
CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 687 (6th ed. 2004) ("Overlay zoning is a flexible alterna-
tive to traditional zoning. To create an overlay zone, a mapped district is superimposed on
one or more established zoning districts. Property within the overlay district is then subject
to two sets of regulations and stipulations: those contained in the underlying zoning district
provisions and those provided for by the overlay zone itself.").
18. For alternatives to this approach, see infra Part V.B-C.
19. This anti-speculation ordinance might also be useful in redevelopment areas to the
extent these areas experience substantial new construction or rehabilitation. Currently,
public and private redevelopment funds targeting affordable housing construction may be
conditioned on the adoption of resale restrictions to preserve their ongoing affordability.
20. This Article assumes no difference between multi-family housing and detached,
single-family housing in respect to general housing affordability as a result of speculation. It
is possible, however, that investment in different structures of housing would affect housing
markets differently. See, e.g., Zhong Yi Tong & John L. Glascock, Price Dynamics of Owner-
Occupied Housing in the Baltimore-Washington Area: Does Structure Type Matter, 11 J. HOUSING
RES. 29, 31 (2000) (finding differences in housing values, appreciation rates and price vola-
tility among condominiums, townhouses and single-family, detached homes).
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hold" or "buy and occupy" housing strategy.1 In the event that a
purchaser desires to sell within three years because of hardship,job
changes, and similar situations, the purchaser would be protected
through full and partial relief provisions included in the zoning
ordinance. Conversations at the local level should determine the
exact content of these relief provisions. The relief provisions would
aim to provide exceptions to the ordinance for those purchasers
truly intending to hold the property for three years, but unable to
complete the period because of extenuating circumstances. The
inclusions of such exceptions to the ordinance would likely neces-
sitate an administrative system to evaluate the merit of waiver
claims, monitor compliance, and conduct enforcement through
civil or perhaps criminal penalties.2
The anti-speculation ordinance is primarily designed for use in
communities experiencing housing affordability pressures, perhaps
as a result of rapid population growth.23 Some details of the im-
plementation of the ordinance, such as the appropriate resale
limitation period, the appropriate punishment for violations, and
the exact conditions allowing full or partial relief, will be difficult
to determine and could vary from region to region. These difficul-
ties need not prevent a critical examination of anti-speculation
possibilities, nor eliminate the chance that an anti-speculation or-
dinance might be enacted.
The next part of this Article, Part II, explores rising property
values and speculative bubbles as a cause for an anti-speculation
ordinance. Part III discusses policy justifications for anti-
speculation measures as well as the obstacles and opportunities fac-
ing governments attempting to address speculation at the local
level. Part IV examines possible legal challenges to implementing
such an ordinance and, in Part V, the Article presents some of the
21. Speculative purchases can encourage abusive practices such as predatory lending,
fraudulent appraisals, suspect construction work, and flipping. An investor might purchase
property looking to quickly resell to a less sophisticated or financially vulnerable buyer at an
inflated price. See Elizabeth Renuart, An Overview of the Predatory Mortgage Lending Process, 15
HOUSING POL'v DEBATE 467, 481 (2004).
22. For some initial thoughts on an administrative structure, see infra Part V. The ad-
ministration of the ordinance is not costless, but local governments can weigh the cost of
enforcing compliance with the costs of speculative investment.
23. Cities in the Southwest and in Florida will experience the most population growth,
according to the U.S. Census. California, Florida and Texas will account for 46% of the na-
tion's growth between 2000 and 2030, gaining a total of about twelve million people. Robert
Bernstein, F/orida, California and Texas to Dominate Future Population Growth, Census Bureau
Reports, U.S. CENSUS BuREAu NEWS, Apr. 21, 2005, http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/
www/releases/archives/population/004704.htm. During this time period, Nevada is pro-
jected to have the highest rate of growth at 114%, followed by Arizona at 109%. Id.
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major practical and political obstacles to implementing an anti-
speculation ordinance. Part VI is a brief conclusion.
II. DIMENSIONS OF THE ISSUE
A. Considering Resistance To Regulation-Social
and Individual Views of Property
Property restrictions provoke strong reactions from many. De-
fenders of private property rights criticize a perceived increase in
the number and magnitude of property restrictions and incursions.
The Supreme Court's decision in Kelo v. City of New London, 4 af-
firming the use of eminent domain to further economic
development goals, sparked particular outrage25 and legislative re-
26sponses.
Residential real estate has long been viewed as a commodity
similar to stocks and bonds that can be leveraged, purchased and
sold with limited restrictions. 7 Moreover the commodification of
property has benefited a broad range of people. The very wealthy,
and those of much more modest means, have made fortunes or
supplemented wage incomes through the buying and selling of
residential real estate. A few fortunate homeowners make more
money in a year from the increased value of their homes than from
28their jobs. In addition to directly benefiting those who own prop-
erty, investment capital can revitalize and gentrify distressed
24. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). For further discussion of Kelo,
see infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., John G. Edwards, 2005 Legislature Limited Eminent Domain Actions, LAs VE-
GAS REv.-J.,June 24, 2005, at 10A ("Harry Pappas, whose family battled the city of Las Vegas
for 11 years to stop the condemnation of its downtown shopping center. . . remains angry
that the city forced the sale of the real estate .... 'America now is just like the Nazi countries
or the communist countries.... When they come to take your property, kill them ..... ");
David D. Kirkpatrick, Ruling on Property Seizure Case Rallies Christian Groups, N.Y. TiMES, July
11, 2005, at Al3 (discussing the convergence of concern by the religious and political right
over eminent domain).
26. See, e.g., H.R. 4128, 109th Cong. § 2(a) (2005) (barring states and local govern-
ments receiving federal economic development funds from using eminent domain for
economic development, which passed by a vote of 376-38); see also Timothy Egan, Ruling Sets
Off Tug of War over Private Property, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2005, at Al (discussing city and state
responses to the Kelo decision).
27. The category of commodifiable "property" interests is expansive. See, e.g., Michael
Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 697, 703-51 (2005) (evaluating
relative economic and non-economic arguments for selling legal claims).
28. See Hubble Smith, Home Appreciation Rates: Homeowners Hit Jackpot, LAs VEGAS REv.-
J., Feb. 20, 2005, at 34A.
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housing, and non-owner occupied housing provides a valuable
source of rental housing.
However, deleterious effects also accompany the increasing
commodification of property. Rapidly increasing housing values
driven more by short-term, speculator investors than by occupying
or "buy and hold" owners can create negative impacts on commu-
nities. 9 Housing becomes increasingly out of reach for those who
live and work within the community, forcing many of them to
commute long distances, live in overcrowded situations, or leave
the community altogether.30 These high real estate costs are a fre-
quent obstacle to attracting and retaining workers in essential
services like nursing, elementary and secondary education, fire
fighting and law enforcement.' Property values, bid higher as a
result of speculation, can decrease rapidly in such a market as
speculators move quickly to unload properties when prices fall.
Finally, conceiving of residential real estate primarily as a com-
modified asset rather than as a shelter or social asset affects
society's approach to urban property questions. The public's view
of property influences what new housing is built, how communities
address affordable housing issues, and how society evaluates the
terms upon which an individual or a family becomes more deserv-
ing of shelter.2 Some legal mechanisms already do exist that
indirectly affect speculation, such as the tax code and its differen-
tial taxation on the sale of property based on duration of
ownership and whether the property is a primary residence,33 but
society's continued anxiety over the effects of speculation on hous-
ing markets suggests that more direct measures are required.
Competing and contradictory conceptions of property limit the
ability of land use regulation to confront speculation. At times,
property represents a path to wealth and independence. Advocates
in this tradition emphasize wealth-building strategies for the poor
29. Those able to purchase homes in a rising housing market may borrow against that
equity during harder times. See, e.g., Ford Fessenden, Where Home Prices Rise Steeply, Bankrupt-
cies Fa, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2005, § 4, at 14.
30. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION'S
HOUSING: 2005, at 1 (2005), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/
markets/son2005/son2005.pdf (discussing housing affordability problems in light of escalat-
ing housing prices).
31. Jennifer Shubinski, Fewer in LV Can Afford to Buy Home, LAS VEGAS SUN, Nov. 11,
2004, at 1A ("Teachers, nurses and hotel workers are being left out in the cold as the ability
to buy a home becomes more out of reach for many in the Las Vegas Valley.").
32. See, e.g., Gerald Torres, The New Property, 56 STAN. L. REV. 741, 753-54 (2003)
("[I] deas of property are intimately tied to ideas of self and community and to the idea of a
polity itself.").
33. See I.R.C. § 121 (2000); IRS, PUBLICATION 523: SELLING YOUR HOME 3, 9 (2005),
available at http://www.irs.gov/publications/p523/.
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so that they too may participate in mainstream wealth creation. 4 At
other times, the social functions of property are accentuated, such
as property's role in providing shelter, building community, facili-
tating participation, and creating personal identity.35 Popular
reaction to the Kelo decision illustrates the passion of some Ameri-
cans for "private" property rights with minimal government
interference. 6 At the same time, popular reaction to the effects of
speculation on residential real estate, particularly its role in push-
ing the prices of houses beyond the reach of many modest home
purchasers, suggests frustration with the problem and open-
mindedness toward addressing it through regulation.7
This anti-speculation ordinance is not a traditional affordable
housing proposal in that it does not incorporate the provision of
subsidies, the inclusion of a certain number of designated afford-
able housing units, or measures to target any specific lower income
purchaser. Instead, its goals are broader. It would minimize the
component of housing price inflation due solely or significantly to
investor expectations of even higher prices. This expectation com-
ponent of housing price fuels speculative purchasing and limits the
ability of lower income buyers to enter the housing market. Addi-
tionally, the ordinance would enable people to conceive of
property in a different way than usual. Through the ordinance,
market-rate property is brought within the ambit of a broader
meaning of property still defined by exchange value concepts, but
also infused with valuations based on property's use value and im-
portance as shelter for individuals and families.
Another affordable housing approach, inclusionary zoning, pro-
vides a useful comparison to the theorization and application of an
anti-speculation ordinance. The two approaches are similar in that
they both attempt to connect market-rate development with the
development of affordable housing. However, they differ in meth-
ods of implementation. The term "inclusionary zoning" generally
describes a number of techniques connecting affordable housing
production to the creation of market-rate housing while also striv-
38ing to achieve income integration within communities.
34. See, e.g., Susan R. Jones, Small Business and Community Economic Development: Transac-
tional Lauyering for Social Change and Economic Justice, 4 CLINICAL L. REv. 195, 195-234
(1997).
35. See, e.g., GREGORY ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS
OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776-1970, at 311-77 (1997); JOsEPH WILLIAM
SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 95-140 (2000).
36. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
37. See examples discussed supra notes 2-8.
38. See infra Part IV (discussing inclusionary zoning methods and cases). For additional
treatments of inclusionary zoning, see generally Nico Calavita et al., Inclusionary Housing in
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Inclusionary zoning creates subsidized, affordable housing units
with income restrictions on occupancy. Typically, developers elect
either to build the housing units themselves or to contribute an
equivalent dollar amount to an affordable housing fund for the
local construction of affordable housing elsewhere.
An anti-speculation ordinance, on the other hand, would have
more of an indirect effect on the production of affordable hous-
ing. It would not designate specific units as affordable housing
units subject to restrictions on occupancy and sales price. Instead,
the ordinance intervenes in the market at a more general level to
eliminate short-term "expectation" values and therefore keep hous-
ing prices within the reach of households just able to afford
homeownership opportunities."
Land speculation generally has not been a focus of affordable
housing scholarship, although commentators have sometimes
mentioned the harm that speculation brings to communities.4
Scholars have discussed anti-speculation measures within discrete
areas such as land trusts, cooperative housing and subsidized af-
fordable housing.4 Affordable housing proponents have also
identified the power of local government land use policies to
California and New Jersey: A Comparative Analysis, 8 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 109 (1997); Laura
M. Padilla, Reflections on Inclusionary Zoning and a Renewed Look at its Viability, 23 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 539 (1995); Barbara Ehrlich Kautz, Comment, In Defense of Inclusionary Zoning: Success-
fully Creating Affordable Housing, 36 U.S.F. L. REv. 971 (2002).
39. By focusing on increased opportunities for homeownership, an anti-speculation
ordinance may be more effective in providing or maintaining affordable housing for a
higher income group of households that find attainable housing difficult to secure but do
not qualify for most heavily-subsidized affordable housing units.
40. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MOVE-
MENT 45 (2001) (describing speculative bubbles as the opposite of community decline). But
see William H. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1335, 1336 (1991) ("The
distinctive feature of social-republican property is that it is held by private individuals subject
to two types of conditions---one requiring that the holder bear a relation of potential active
participation in a group or community constituted by the property, and another designed to
limit inequality among the members of a group or community.").
41. Sponsors of affordable housing regularly include purchase, transfer, and accumu-
lation restrictions to preserve a unit's affordability for future purchasers or to ensure
repayment of the subsidy. See generally David M. Abramowitz, Community Land Trusts and
Ground Leases, I J. AFFORDABLE HousING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 5 (1992) (discussing the
utility of a community land trust model to preserve affordable housing); Michael F. Keeley &
Peter B. Manzo, Resale Restrictions and Leverage Controls, 1 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COM-
MUNITY DEV. L. 9 (1992) (discussing strategies to create and preserve affordable housing
including deed restrictions, affordability covenants, options, and specialized mortgages);
Deborah Kenn, Paradise Unfound: The American Dream of Housing Justice for All, 5 B.U. PUB.
INT. L.J. 69 (1995) (discussing community land trusts, limited equity cooperatives, and mu-
tual housing associations); David H. Kirkpatrick, Cooperatives and Mutual Housing Associations,
I J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 7 (1992) (comparing cooperatives and
mutual housing associations to other ownership structures designed to create and preserve
affordable housing).
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create, as well as frustrate, affordable housing opportunities. 2 This
land use scholarship does not generally apply anti-speculation
measures to the broader housing market nor does this scholarship
evaluate the possibility of addressing speculation through the gov-
ernment's general power to enact local land use legislation.43
Policyrnakers and commentators should continue the discussion
of more effective ways to implement existing affordable housing
approaches. At the same time, new approaches, like an anti-
speculation ordinance, provide alternatives to the persistent
scramble to capture scarce, ever-deeper subsidies from public and
private sources in order to increase housing opportunities for
lower income households. An anti-speculation ordinance that re-
stricts resales offers local communities a better strategy-both
theoretically sound and practical to implement-to address the
serious social problems caused by speculation in residential prop-
erty.
B. Magnitude of Housing Appreciation
Increasing home prices over the last several years may indicate
the presence of a speculative bubble" within the real estate market.
Similarly, scholars and economists are concerned with the effects
of a steep decline in real estate values on the macroeconomy and
on individuals.5 The potential effects of a sharp decline are par-
42. See generally GROwTH MANAGEMENT AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING: Do THEY CON-
FLICT? (Anthony Downs ed., 2004) (including several studies that analyze the connections
between growth management programs and the cost of housing); PETER W. SALSICH, JR. &
TIMOTHY J. TRYNIECKI, LAND USE REGULATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS AND PRACTICAL APPLI-
CATION OF LAND USE LAw 377-420 (Am. Bar Assoc. 2003) (1991) (discussing municipal
barriers to affordable housing).
43. Limiting the alienability of property in order to preserve affordable housing is also
implicated in discussions of rent control and condominium conversion. See, e.g., Victoria A.
Judson, Defining Property Rights: The Constitutionality of Protecting Tenants from Condominium
Conversion, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 179, 213 (1983) (suggesting "a unified theory of tak-
ings doctrine applicable to condominium conversion regulation in which non-economic
interests in occupancy of property, specifically the ability to use property as a base for politi-
cal participation and for the creation of an identity, limit protection of classic economic
investment interests in property, i.e. the ability to use property to generate income").
44. Indicators of a bubble include when prices of assets rise out of step with underly-
ing fundamentals and buyers purchase, in large part based on their expectations of future
price increases. Jonathan McCarthy & Richard W. Peach, Are Home Prices the Next "Bubble"?,
FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL'Y REv., Dec. 2004, at 4.
45. See, e.g., In Come the Waves, ECONOMIST, June 16, 2005, at 66 ("Never before have
real house prices risen so fast, for so long, in so many countries. Property markets have been
frothing from America, Britain and Australia to France, Spain and China. Rising property
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ticularly worrisome considering the significant proportion of indi-
vidual household wealth held in real estate across income and class
levels. For example, households held $14.6 trillion in real estate
assets at the end of 2003, comprising about twenty-eight percent of
individual household assets.4 6 Comparatively, at the peak of the
stock market in 2000, households held $12.8 trillion in corporate
equities and mutual funds.4 ' A discussion of whether real estate
values are heading toward the same steep fall as equity values dur-
ing the most recent stock market downturn is largely beyond the
scope of this Article." It is enough to note that real property own-
ership is deep and broad; it comprises a significant portion of
individual household wealth and this ownership extends across
multiple income classes.
Housing appreciation rates have approached unprecedented
levels. The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
(OFHEO) is a federal agency charged with ensuring the safety of the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) and the
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) .4 9 The
OFHEO publishes a quarterly report on housing values across the
nation. 0 For the quarter ending March 31, 2005, Nevada led the na-
tion with a one-year housing appreciation rate of thirty-one
percent.5 1 California's one-year average was second at twenty-five
percent and Hawaii, Washington D.C., Florida, and Maryland
prices helped to prop up the world economy after the stockmarket bubble burst in 2000.
What if the housing boom now turns to bust?").
46. McCarthy & Peach, supra note 44, at 2.
47. Id.
48. See generally Karl E. Case & RobertJ. Shiller, Is There a Bubble in the Housing Market?,
2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 299 (2003).
49. The OFHEO was established by the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety
and Soundness Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550, § 1311, 106 Stat. 3941, 3944 (1992) (codi-
fied at 12 U.S.C. 4511 (2000)).
50. The OFHEO calculates a Housing Price Index
based on transactions involving conforming, conventional mortgages purchased or
securitized by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. Only mortgage transactions on single-
family properties are included. "Conforming" refers to a mortgage that both meets
the underwriting guidelines of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac and that doesn't exceed
the conforming loan limit, a figure linked to an index published by the Federal
Housing Finance Board. The conforming mortgage loan limit for single-family
homes in 2005 increased to $359,650 from $337,000 in 2004. "Conventional" means
that the mortgages are neither insured nor guaranteed by the FHA, VA, or other fed-
eral government entity.... Mortgage transactions on condominiums or multi-unit
properties are also excluded.
Press Release, Office of Fed. Hous. Enter. Oversight, U.S. House Prices Continue to Rise
Rapidly: OFHEO's House Price Index Shows a 12.5 Percent Increase Over the Past Year, at
12 (June 1, 2005), available at http://www.ofheo.gov/media/pdf/lq05hpi.pdf.
51. Id. at 8.
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respectively rounded out the states whose one-year appreciation
rates exceeded twenty percent.52 The average one-year appreciation
rate across the country was 12.5%. 53 This appreciation rate was
higher than the appreciation rate in 2004, the highest rate in
twenty-five years. a Of the twenty metropolitan statistical areas
(MSAs) with the highest rates of housing price appreciation, the
area with the highest rate was Bakersfield, California at 33.7%.55
The Las Vegas, Nevada MSA and the Reno, Nevada MSA followed
at 33.2% and 31.8% respectively.56
Historically low interest rates, strong income growth, and inves-
tor speculation have fueled rising home prices. In Clark County,
Nevada, where housing prices have risen more steeply than any
other area in the nation except one (Bakersfield, California), the
share of investor purchases in the residential real estate market
increased from below twenty percent in 2002 to sometimes over
forty percent in 2004 and 2005Y.5 Nationally, residential loans to
non-owner occupied housing purchasers increased from seven to
eleven percent between 1998 and 2003Y. Similarly, a study by the
National Association of Realtors found that twenty-three percent of
houses purchased in 2004 were for investment and not for owner
occupation."
This pattern of investment suggests two areas of further inquiry.
First, what happens to individuals and communities when the
housing "bubble" bursts?6° Second, can and should local govern-
ments attempt to manage speculative investment in order to
preserve housing affordability, healthy housing markets, and sus-
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1.
55. Id. at 19.
56. See id. at 19 (finding that of the top twenty MSAs, fourteen are in California, two
are in Nevada, and four are in Florida).
57. CLARK COUNTY COMM'N, CLARK COUNTY COMMUNITY GROWTH TASK FORCE RE-
PORT APPENDICES app. 4, at 19 (2005), available at http://www.co.clark.nv.us/clark-County/
GrowthraskForce/communit.growth.htm (follow "Report Appendixes" hyperlink). Las
Vegas' fifty-two percent increase in prices for resale homes in one quarter set a national
record. Hubble Smith, LV Median Home Price Increase Sets Record, LAs VEGAS Rv.-J., Aug. 17,
2004, at Al.
58. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 30, at 4.
59. Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors, Second-Home Market Surges, Bigger Than Shown
in Earlier Studies (Mar. 1, 2005), http://www.realtor.org/PublicAffairsWeb.nsf/Pages/
SecongHomeMktSurges05.
60. See, e.g., Hubble Smith, Report Asks: What Trouble, Housing Bubbler, LAS VEGAS REv.-
J., Oct. 11, 2005, at DI (noting dangers posed by riskier loan products). See generally Frank
Partnoy, Why Markets Crash and What Can Law Do About It, 61 U. PITT. L. REv. 741 (2000)
(discussing bubble concerns in other market sectors).
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tainable communities?61 It is the second inquiry that this Article
addresses.
C. Identification and Efficiency of Speculation
Investors, using their particular knowledge of local real estate
patterns, may place their money in real estate in anticipation of
future development. Seeking the best rates of return on their capi-
tal, individuals living in one state can invest in real estate in other
states with relative easeY. International investors likewise conduct
these transactions from afar; they often view American real estate
as a more stable and higher performing investment opportunity
than other assets, including real estate, in their home countries. As
a result, international investment is one component of the growth
of upscale condominiums in cities like Miami and Las Vegas, as
well as the proliferation of "phantom" units purchased by investors
from the United States and abroad that remain largely unoccu-
pied .
Differentiating speculative investment from other forms of in-
vestment is not easy. The buyer who purchases a townhouse for
$135,000 in a rapidly increasing market and sells it fifty-five days
later for $169,000 is commonly identified as a speculator." Other
investment patterns are not so clear. The anti-speculation zoning
ordinance solves this difficulty through its three-year resale re-
quirement. This requirement deters purchasers with shorter time
horizons from purchasing, or at least limits their ability to profit
upon early resale.
The market-based argument for adopting alienation restrictions
calls for correcting the market distortions associated with
speculative investment on supply and demand signals in the
housing market.65 Speculative investment activity does not
61. See infra Parts III-IV (exploring legal and policy theories justifying government in-
tervention).
62. Websites like www.CondoFlip.com facilitate speculation in the condominium mar-
ket by making it easier to purchase condominium units without the need to physically
inspect the property.
63. See Jesse M. Keenan, Affordable Housing Policy in Miami: Inclusionary Zoning and the
Median-Income Demographic, 14 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 110, 111
(2005); see also Jennifer Robison, Just Who Is Buying Luxury Condos?, LAs VEGAS REv.-J., Oct.
13, 2005, at DI ("[Miore than 95 percent of luxury condo buyers in the local market aren't
actually from the local market.").
64. SeeJ.M. Kalil, supra note 10, at 23A.
65. Michael Schill discusses market imperfections and artificial supply constraints as
one possible justification for government intervention in the housing market through
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necessarily correspond to an increased demand for rental or owner
occupied housing. 6  Developers responding to false market
demand signals overproduce housing, which leads to an oversupply
and falling prices. During the production phase, housing prices
are bid up in expectation of future, higher prices. Also
contributing to this distortion are speculative purchases fueled by
the increasingly innovative mortgage products that require less
cash upfront or during the first few years of payment than
conventional thirty-year fixed-rate mortgages. At some point, the
oversupply limits the upward trend in housing prices and the
growth levels off, or the bubble bursts. Those holding property
purely for investment purposes are likely to sell quickly, thereby
steepening price declines.
Speculation may not be an efficient market phenomenon. Pro-
fessor Lynn Stout demonstrates that the heterogeneous
expectations model of speculation reveals market inefficiencies
that other theories of speculation, such as risk hedging6 8 and in-
formation arbitrage69 models, cannot account for. The key
assumption of the heterogenous expectations model is that two
speculators may have different expectations of the future.70 When
public housing. Michael H. Schill, Privatizing Federal Low Income Housing Assistance: The Case of
Public Housing, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 878, 891-92 (1990).
66. The condominium market in some cities reflects a difference between demand
signals and housing supply. See Keenan, supra note 63, at 111 ("[Blecause the absorption
rates for these [investment condominium] projects are artificially skewed, the market uses
these numbers to modify its own price adjustments. That is to say, the rates are artificially
skewed to the extent that the numbers do not accurately reflect the actual housing need.").
67. These innovative finance products increase the liquidity within the real estate
market, helping to make a traditionally illiquid investment more easily transferable by in-
creasing the number of buyers and the relative ease with which they acquire these
properties. See, e.g., Federal Reserve Board's Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress:
Hearing Before the Comm. on Financial Servs., 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Alan Green-
span, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/hh/2005/july/testimony.htrn ("The apparent froth in housing markets appears
to have interacted with evolving practices in mortgage markets. The increase in the preva-
lence of interest-only loans and the introduction of more-exotic forms of adjustable-rate
mortgages are developments of particular concern."); Eduardo Porter, Good News, Bad News:
Your Loan's Approved, N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 28, 2005, § 3, at 1 (describing creative financing tech-
niques in rising housing market).
68. Under risk hedging, speculators "profit by accepting risk from more risk-averse
'hedgers' .... " Stout, supra note 13, at 708. Economic theory says that this improves alloca-
tive efficiency by increasing net welfare. Id.
69. In information arbitrage, "speculators invest in predictive information that allows
them to trade at an advantage with less well informed consumers and producers." Id.
Economic theory says this improves allocative efficiency through improving the accuracy of
market prices. Id.
70. Id. at 742 ("[T]raders who share identical risk preferences and willingness to invest
in information nevertheless may trade voluntarily in assets they neither produce nor con-
sume if they make differing estimates of the probability distribution of future prices. In
[VOL. 39:3
Fear and Loathing
speculators trade with other speculators based on disagreement,
the result is a zero sum game in which one person's gain is an-
other's loss. With transaction costs, Stout argues that speculation
reduces average trader welfare and creates inefficiency.7'
Additionally, optimistic investors who believe prices will rise have
an easier time entering the market than those investors who think
prices will fall. In other words, it is easier in housing markets to go
long (purchase assets for future sale betting that prices will rise)
than to sell short (obtaining profit on assets an investor does not
yet own on the expectation that prices will fall in the future).
Therefore, a greater number of optimistic, bullish speculators en-
ter the market putting upward pressure on asset prices.72 This
upward price pressure departs from the average price expectation
of the market, which may be a more accurate reflection of true as-
set value than speculative expectations. The gap between
speculative and average price expectations contributes to market
inefficiency.
III. LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND SPECULATION
A. Addressing the Problem at the Local Level
Land use regulation is a local affair. City councils, local planning
boards, and citizen task forces discuss and enact land use regula-
tions responsive to local needs. These regulations, in turn, impact
the development and purchasing decisions of local, national, and
international constituencies alike. While local governments have
little control over national and international capital markets, local
governments have a much greater voice in how this capital is de-
ployed within a particular community. Additionally, local
governments increasingly have been left with the responsibility to
deal with regional and national affordable housing issues.73 Federal
involvement in affordable housing efforts has decreased over
recent decades, forcing state and local governments to shoulder
more of the burden of affordable housing creation and
effect, [heterogeneous expectations] speculation is a form of wagering where the gamblers
bet on market prices, rather than on the outcome of a card game or sporting contest.")
(emphasis omitted).
71. Id. at 745.
72. Id. at 759.
73. For a discussion of the interconnections between federal, state, and local afford-
able housing efforts, see generally Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Saving Our Cities: What Role Should the
Federal Government Play, 36 URB. LAw. 475 (2004).
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maintenance. To the extent that local governments are on the
front lines of the affordable housing problem, they must employ
innovative and effective solutions.75
A local approach may generate externalities that could be
minimized by regional, statewide, or national coordination.7 6 For
example, anti-speculation measures could be adopted at a higher
level by a regional land use agency, or through the coordination of
local jurisdictions. Regional action in this sense would face differ-
ent legal challenges than action by a local government. In
particular, a court would employ a slightly different analysis to de-
termine whether the regional agency has the authority to
implement such measures.7' Even though there are differences, an
analysis of anti-speculation measures based on local municipal im-
plementation could still inform the creation of regional efforts.
An advantage of local municipal adoption of anti-speculation
measures is the opportunity for local governments to be the cata-
lysts for larger geographic implementations of these measures.
Nearby jurisdictions will feel the impact of any anti-speculation or-
dinance. For example, speculators deterred from investing in a
municipality covered by the ordinance may shift their investment
to nearby communities. It may then be advantageous for nearby
communities to adopt similar speculation restrictions. Eventually, a
more coordinated regional effort may develop to address these and
other housing policy externalities.
Critiques of local governments' efforts to facilitate the construc-
tion of affordable housing understandably recognize local
parochialism and NIMBY7 8 sentiments as barriers to affordable
74. See Minor Myers III, A Redistributive Role for Local Government, 36 URB. LAw. 753,
754-56 (2004) (describing devolution of welfare authority to states and proposing a greater
role for local government); see also Katherine M. O'Regan & John M. Quigley, Federal Policy
and the Rise of Nonprofit Housing Providers, 11J. HOUSING RES. 297, 297 (2000) (describing the
low income housing tax credit and the HOME programs). But see Otto Hetzel, Asserted Fed-
eral Devolution of Public Housing Policy and Administration: Myth or Reality, 3 WAsH. U. J.L. &
POL'Y 415, 420 (2003) (noting that the federal government retains authority over many
aspects of public housing programs).
75. Myers argues that local governments should be allowed more redistributive re-
sponsibility. States are suboptimal redistributors due to their inability to exclude. Myers,
supra note 74, at 755-56.
76. For a discussion of tensions between local government policies and regional ef-
fects, see generally David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. Rev. 2255 (2003);
Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter: Addressing the
Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985 (2000).
77. For more discussion on legal authority, see infra Part IV. A regional agency would
likely be more limited by express grants of authority within a state statute than cities.
78. NIMBY, an acronym for "Not In My Back Yard," describes local homeowners' gen-
eral tolerance for affordable housing as long as it is not near existing neighborhoods.
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housing production.79 Some studies suggest stronger regional and
state planning efforts to counter the tendencies of local jurisdic-
tions to advance their particular land use self-interest, at the
potential expense of neighboring jurisdictions or poor people
generally.80 For this reason, an anti-speculation ordinance ideally
would begin as state legislation authorizing or requiring, in certain
instances, the local adoption of an anti-speculation ordinance. A
local jurisdiction's obligation to consider anti-speculation measures
could be a component of the jurisdiction's comprehensive plan-
ning process.
Local governments generally have broad authority to enact legis-
lation regulating property in light of emerging social and
economic needs.81 Two recent examples illustrate the depth and
breadth of property controversies engendered by local government
decisions. In one example, owners of a residential hotel in San
Francisco unsuccessfully asserted a takings claim against a city or-
dinance requiring a $567,000 conversion fee in exchange for
allowing the owners to convert the residential hotel into a tourist
hotel.82 The ordinance was designed to address the loss of valuable
affordable housing in a city with an extreme affordable housing
shortage."' The Court found that a sufficient relationship existed
between the means (provision of replacement housing or a pay-
ment in lieu) and the ends (preservation of affordable housing
79. See generally NAT'L Low INCOME HOUSING COAL., GETTING TO YIMBY: LESSONS IN
YES IN MY BACK YARD (2003), available at http://www.nlihc.org/nimby/2003-l.pdf; U.S.
DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., "WHY NOT IN OUR COMMUNITY?" REMOVING BARRIERS TO
AFFORDABLE HOUSING (2005), available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/
wnioc.pdf (describing state and local efforts to reduce regulatory barriers to affordable
housing); Tim Iglesias, Housing Impact Assessments: Opening New Doors for State Housing Regula-
tion While Localism Persists, 82 OR. L. REv. 433, 455-58 (2003) (describing local governments'
nonconsideration of the external impacts of land use regulation). Iglesias observes that
"[flundamentally, housing suffers from not being consistently integrated into the whole
range of local governments' policy and decision making." Id. at 451.
80. See, e.g., STUART MECK ET AL., AM. PLANNING ASS'N, REGIONAL APPROACHES TO AF-
FORDABLE HOUSING 187-97 (2003) (evaluating possible regional approaches to planning for
affordable housing).
81. The Court in Kelo twice noted the importance of responding to the evolving needs
of society. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2664 (2005) ("[O]urjurispru-
dence has recognized that the needs of society have varied between different parts of the
Nation, just as they have evolved over time in response to changed circumstances."); see also
id. at 2662 (considering the "always evolving needs of society").
82. San Remo Hotel v. San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 91-92 (Cal. 2002). On appeal to the
U.S. Supreme Court, a unanimous Court refused to recognize an exception to the full faith
and credit statute for federal courts to hear takings claims issues litigated in state courts. San
Remo Hotel v. San Francisco, 125 S. Ct. 2491, 2495 (2005).
83. San Remo, 41 P.3d at 92.
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stock) of the statute5 4 Regarding the fairness of inflicting such a
regulation on residential hotel owners when they personally did
not contribute to the poverty in San Francisco, the court noted
that "[a] use not in itself noxious or harmful, such as the operation
of a tourist hotel, may nonetheless call for mitigation when the
change of property to that use results in the loss of an existing use
of public importance." 5
In the second example, the local government in New London,
Connecticut attempted to use eminent domain authorized by a
state statute to acquire individual properties pursuant to a com-
86prehensive economic development plan. In doing so, the City of
New London sparred not only with local constituents, but also with
national opponents who perceived this action as overreaching into
the sphere of individual property rights. The U.S. Supreme Court,
in Kelo v. City of New London, upheld the local government's use of
eminent domain by a five to four vote. 7
Although the dissent in Kelo was concerned with the protection
of individual property rights generally, both Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor and Justice Clarence Thomas chose rhetoric that de-
scribed homeowners and occupied homes rather than homes
owned for investment. O'Connor focused on Wilhemina Dery and
her husband as long-term occupants of one house and their son
living next door in a house he received as a wedding present.88
Similarly, Thomas focused on the danger of "uprooting" people
from their homes, particularly in "poor communities. "89 Thus the
harm to property the dissent was truly concerned about may not be
the harm to property rights generally, but instead the threat to a
84. Id. at 107. The Supreme Court recently invalidated this method of analyzing tak-
ings claims. See discussion infra notes 204-205 and accompanying text.
85. San Remo, 41 P.3d at 10.
86. The opinion contains at least six separate references to a development plan. See
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658-59, 2661-62, 2665, 2667; see also Brief of the Am. Planning Ass'n et
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 25-26, Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct.
2655 (2005) (No. 04-108) (arguing that the Supreme Court should consider eminent do-
main as one component of sound land use planning). Although the Supreme Court ruled
that economic development is a sufficient public purpose to justify eminent domain, the
publicity and delay associated with the litigation has apparently harmed the viability of the
project. See William Yardley, After Eminent Domain Victory, Disputed Project Goes Nowhere, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 2005, at AIC ("With so many complications, some people are unsure
whether the city's initial vision for the property-a mix of housing, hotel and office space
intended to transform part of its riverfront and bolster a declining tax base-is even realistic
anymore.").
87. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668.
88. Id. at 2671 (O'ConnorJ., dissenting).
89. Id. at 2677 (ThomasJ, dissenting).
[VOL. 39:3
Fear and Loathing
particular type of property-people's homes. ° Anti-speculation
measures can tap into a similar rhetoric of home protection by de-
fending the occupation of one's home against the negative
economic and social effects of speculators."
B. Responding to Private Market Activity
Affordable housing is a primary goal of the anti-speculation or-
dinance, but it is not the only goal. Preexisting private market
activity suggests justifications for anti-speculation measures outside
of affordable housing. Increasingly, private developers creating de-
tached, single-family housing communities have employed
restrictions on renting and resale to limit speculation.2 Developers
may include provisions restricting the rental of property, may re-
quire buyers selling their property within a certain time period to
sell to the developer at a set price, or may require buyers selling
property to remit a percentage of the sales profit to the developer.
9
3
Developers' motives for such restrictions vary. Some developers
may not want to compete with new owners for buyers in a particu-
lar community. Another reason to adopt restrictions concerns the
crafting of the character of the neighborhood. Developers may
have an interest in promoting an image of long-term, stable
homeownership. This is subverted by a proliferation of "for sale"
signs and the uncertain upkeep of short-term rentals or homes
owned by absent investors.94 Similarly, developers may have an
interest in building a neighborhood or community, particularly
considering the popularity of New Urbanism and its emphasis on
90. The amicus brief of the American Planning Association and the National Congress
for Community Economic Development asked the Supreme Court to consider adjusting, for
occupied dwellings, the calculation of just compensation required under eminent domain
to account for traditionally uncompensated losses such as an owner's subjective value and
consequential costs of relocation, Brief of the Am. Planning Ass'n. et a]., supra note 86, at
27-30.
91. For a discussion of the meaning of "home" in the law, see generally Lorna Fox, The
Meaning of Home: A Chimerical Concept or a Legal Challenge?, 29J.L. & Soc'y 580 (2002).
92. See, e.g., Daniela Deane, Developers Try to Limit Speculative Flipping,' WASH. POST,
May 21, 2005, at Fl.
93. See, e.g., Jennifer Shubinski, Pulte Buyers in Escrow Must Sign Addendum for Reduced
Prices, LAS VEGAS SUN, Nov. 3, 2004, at 5C ("A handful of homebuilders throughout the Las
Vegas Valley have added the forms [restricting resales within twelve months] in an attempt
to curb investor purchases and in what many said was a move to protect true homeowners.").
94. See, e.g., Glen Creno, Builders Toughening Rules with Investors, ARIz. REPUBLIC, Mar.
13, 2005, at HV2; Glen Creno & Catherine Reagor Burrough, Valley Builders Shoo Buyers Look-
ingfor a Quick Buck, ARiz. REPUBLIC, Aug. 1, 2004, at DI (discussing responses to speculation
by home builders).
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neighborhood design. 5 These "neighborhood builders" may resent
those buyers who frustrate the carefully designed community im-
age that was promised to local government officials and sold to the
public.
Private developer restrictions that capture gains on sales, such as
provisions requiring a mandatory fee on subsequent sales of homes
to be paid to the developer, suggest an alternative administrative
structure to a government imposed sales restraint. 96 An anti-
speculation ordinance might also take some percentage of subse-
quent sales receipts from future sellers and use that money for some
general community purpose. The calculation of the appropriate
percentage could be based on some idea of a reasonable return on
investment or perhaps the general market return on housing across
the nation or across the state. The underlying rationale of a per-
centage calculation is to divert gains obtained due to surrounding
community development away from individual sellers and back into
the community.
97
Even without government involvement, developer resale restric-
tions are worth examining given the increasing privatization of city
and suburban spaces.98 Comprehensively planned common interest
communities, sometimes characterized by gates controlling public
entry and exit, as well as privately owned roadways within, continue
to increase in popularity. As these communities grow in number
and size, privately-imposed, anti-speculation restrictions could have
95. New Urbanism is a planning and development movement that emphasizes pedes-
trian activity, neighbor interaction, and the integration of housing and commercial uses. For
further discussions of New Urbanism, see generally Congress for the New Urbanism, Charter
of the New Urbanism (2001), http://www.cnu.org/cnureports/Charter.pdf; Charles C.
Bohl, New Urbanism and the City: Potential Applications and Implications for Distressed Inner-City
Neighborhoods, 11 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 761 (2000); Emily Talen, The Social Goals of New
Urbanism, 13 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 165 (2002); Congress for the New Urbanism, http://
www.cnu.org/aboutcnu (last visited Apr. 2, 2006).
96. The National Association of Home Builders surveyed its members in April 2005.
The survey solicited information about the scope of investor and speculator activity in dif-
ferent cities, as well as builders' responses. Builders reported the following responses to
investor activity: 82% said they would sell only to buyers for owner occupancy; 64% said the
buyer cannot sell the home or "nominate" the contract before closing; 55% said the buyer
cannot sell during the first year after purchase; 36% said the buyer must give the builder the
first right to buy back if the home is sold within the first year; 36% said the home cannot be
rented within the first year; 36% said they were limiting the number of investor sales per lot
release; 27% said they would not provide sales incentives to investors; 18% said they would
not sell more than one home to buyers with the same last names; 18% used a variety of
measures, including charging a fee (often $50,000) if homes are resold within the first year.
NAT'L ASSOC. OF HOME BUILDERS, THE SEIDERS' REPORT:JULY 11, 2005, at 11 (2005).
97. See discussion infra Part III.C.
98. See generally EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATIONS AND THE
RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT (1994) (chronicling increasing numbers of
private common interest communities).
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a similar effect on local land use patterns as publicly-imposed
restrictions.99
C. Capturing the Gains of Speculative Investment
The theory that speculation gains on residential property create
harmful effects explains the rationale for an anti-speculation ordi-
nance. Anti-speculation measures do not go so far as to
characterize speculation gains as "windfalls" or "unearned" prof-
its.1°° Indeed, significant planning and investment of resources may
accompany an individual investor's decision to speculate on rising
housing values in a particular area. Instead, this anti-speculation
ordinance works as a compromise, balancing private and public
interests by allowing speculators to ultimately keep gains, but defer
recognition of these gains (in the form of a sale of the asset) for
three years.101
This "compromise" approach is far less reaching than the ap-
proaches described by Ebenezer Howard and Henry George.
Nevertheless, these urban reformers describe a model of urban
and suburban life that is helpful in formulating a context for anti-
speculation efforts. An anti-speculation ordinance would not, and
need not, embrace the economic foundation of Henry George's
single tax proposal in toto. But George's perspective on the distinc-
tions between speculative investors and owner occupants remains
useful today.
These two urban reformers of the late 1800s and early 1900s
envisioned a city life and structure quite different from the one
we have today02 Howard's To-morrow: A Peaceful Path to Real
99. Particularly because of their effects on nonmembers, some argue that private resi-
dential associations should be treated as state actors. See, e.g., David J. Kennedy, Note,
Residential Associations as State Actors: Regulating the Impact of Gated Communities on Nonmembers,
105 YALE L.J. 761, 763 (1995). A NewJersey court recently found a residential association to
be a constitutional actor under the New Jersey Constitution and therefore required to re-
spect its members' freedom of speech. Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers
Homeowners' Ass'n, 890 A.2d 947 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006).
100. See Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J. 1489, 1505 (1999) (distinguishing profits
derived from speculation from windfalls, noting "real estate speculators often look like for-
tuitous beneficiaries of regional population movements ... [but] land speculators closely
study growth patterns and commit resources to assembling parcels of useful size and shape
in desirable locations").
101. An alternative application of the ordinance could require that new purchasers be
owner occupants. This approach would keep speculators out of the market altogether. For a
discussion of this approach, see Part V.
102. For early city reform struggles, see generallyJON C. TEAFORD, THE UNHERALDED
TRIUMPH: CITY GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 1870-1900 (1983).
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Reform03 presents an economic and social rationale for the physical
design of a social city in which the public owns the "unearned in-
crement" of land-that part of property value associated with
surrounding activity rather than the activity of the owner of the
property.0 4 This theory of urban reform echoed the work of Henry
George. l5 George is perhaps most remembered for his proposal of
a single tax on land,10 6 a tax on land values themselves without re-
gard to the improvements made on that land.0 7 The increased
value of land due to surrounding activities and the provision of
public services would belong to the public instead of a private
landowner. This "unearned increment," defined as increases in
land value independent of owner effort and due to factors such as
"general community development, government investment in
schools, streets, parks, population growth, and rising incomes"
would be used as local government revenue.08 This form of taxa-
tion is different from the well-known property tax that combines
taxation of both the value of underlying land and the value of im-
provements on the land.
Two key ideas underlie George's land value taxation proposal.
One idea is that land is different from other kinds of property.
George believed that property such as "houses, crops, money, fur-
niture, capital or wealth" °9 belongs to an individual as the result of
103. See generally EBENEZER HOWARD, GARDEN CITIES OF TO-MORRow (1902).
104. SeeALAN RABINOWITZ, URBAN ECONOMICS AND LAND USE IN AMERICA 19 (2004).
105. HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY (Robert Schalkenbach Foundation 1960)
(1879).
106. See id. at 434-36. George's proposal would make land value taxation the sole means
of financing government activity and is therefore commonly referred to as the "single tax."
Besides deterring land speculation, an additional benefit of this form of financing is that it
would avoid taxation on labor (in the form of income tax) and therefore decrease the fi-
nancial burden on the labor class, a class George championed. George also believed in the
decommodification of cities, under which monopolies such as telegraph lines and streetcars
should be heavily regulated or owned by the government rather than by private companies
who would encounter no competition. Id. at 412.
107. Land value taxation has been used in New Zealand; parts of Australia; Johannes-
burg, South Africa; and parts of Pennsylvania, among other places. William Vickrey,
Simplification, Progrssion, and a Level Playing Field, in LAND-VALUE TAXATION: THE EQUITABLE
AND EFFICIENT SOURCE OF PUBLIC FINANCE 17, 18 (Kenneth C. Wenzer ed., 1999) [hereinaf-
ter LAND-VALUE TAXATION]; see also RHODA HELLMAN, HENRY GEORGE RECONSIDERED 120-
21 (1987) (discussing taxation reforms in Pennsylvania). Several varying applications of the
land tax are possible. For details of different possible applications and counterarguments,
see generally HELLMAN, supra, at 158-68; LAND-VALUE TAXATION, supra; Stewart E. Sterk,
Nollan, Henry George, and Exactions, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1731 (1988) (discussing Henry
George's economic ideas within the context of land use exactions).
108. C. Lowell Harriss, Fundamental and Feasible Improvements of Property Taxation, in
LAND-VALUE TAXATION, supra note 107, at 100, 105.
109. KENNETH C. WENZER, AN ANTHOLOGY OF HENRY GEORGE'S THOUGHT 68 (1997)




his "individual exertion,"" ° and to tax this property amounted to
"robbery.".. 1 But land was a different sort of property. "It has no
reference to the cost of production, as has the value of houses,
horses, ships, clothes, or other things produced by labor, for land is
not produced by man, it was created by God."'1 2 He later adds,
"the value of land only arises with the growth and improvement of
the community, and therefore properly belongs to the community.
It is not because of what its owners have done, but because of the
presence of the whole great population, that land in New York is
worth millions an acre.,1
3
Whether the unearned increment arose through divine design
or secular neighborhood activity, George did not believe that the
entire increment belonged to any individual landowner.
The second idea is that land value taxation deters speculation
on vacant land by taxing that land more heavily than under tradi-
tional property taxation principles."4 Under this view, speculation
in land causes economic waste by encouraging leapfrog develop-
ment and sprawl, and causes users to over-develop existing land by
limiting the overall availability of land."1
George's land taxation ideas garnered a small but loyal following
in the United States. 1 6 Some commentators attribute the lack of
popular support for his proposals to a lack of class consciousness,
especially in an era witnessing the emergence of America as a




114. George believed that the right tax policy could deter land speculation. GEORGE,
supra note 105, at 436 ("For under this system no one would care to hold land unless to use
it, and land now withheld from use would everywhere be thrown open to improvement....
[L]and speculation would receive its death blow... ."). See also KEVIN MATTSON, CREATING
A DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC 33 (1998) (discussing the fight of Progressive social reformer and
former mayor of Cleveland, Tom Johnson, against private ownership of street railways and
the subsequent commodification of Cleveland).
115. Harry Gunnison Brown, Land Speculation and Land-Value Taxation, in LAND-VALUE
TAXATION, supra note 107, at 46; see also T. Nicholaus Tideman, Taxing Land is Better Than
Neutral: Land Taxes, Land Speculation, and the Timing of Development, in LAND-VALUE TAxA-
TION, supra note 107, at 124-31 ("[A]llocative improvements from taxing land arise because
land taxes mitigate market imperfections.").
116. George's book, Progress and Poverty, was widely read. Indeed, one commentator
notes that the book "probably had the greatest circulation of any non-fiction book in the
English language before 1900 except for the Bible."JAcoB OSER, HENRY GEORGE 68 (1974).
See also EDWARD J. ROSE, HENRY GEORGE 7 (1968) ("There was a time, not long ago, when
Henry George's name was a household word. Once known to men in every walk of life,
Henry George has now passed into relative obscurity.. . ."). For a history of the land value
taxation movement in the United States, see HELLMAN, supra note 107, at 105-23, 133-57.
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world industrial power."1 7 Though individual wealth remained hard
to come by, the country as a whole could buy into the ethos and
idealism of capitalism as a means to propel America forward.""
Another commentator notes that people misunderstood George's
argument for funneling land rents to the public to mean a pro-
posal for the confiscation and nationalization of land itself under
common, public ownership."9  Additionally, critics proposed
counterarguments to George's proposal including the difficulty in
distinguishing intrinsic land value from improvements, the justice
of appropriating land rents for the public, and the incentive to
overbuild.120
However, the underlying force of George's argument remains
true: there is a tension between public and private allocations of
land value not directly attributable to landowner labor. To the ex-
tent that this value allocation remains contested, the distribution of
wealth in a city remains contested. Put another way, there can be
merit in limiting the private appropriation of this property wealth,
even if there is less support for appropriating the entirety of it for
public use.
George's focus on land speculation raises one last issue. To the
extent that land speculation is harmful, it is harmful in large part
because the supply of land is inelastic. No one will produce more
land in response to higher prices caused by speculation. Housing is
different. Builders can respond to rising housing prices by increas-
ing production which will increase the supply of housing and,
according to conventional economic theory, bring prices down.
But this additional supply may not be costless. If speculation has
117. Kenneth C. Wenzer, Some Reasons That Americans Do Not Listen to Henry George, in
LAND-VALUE TAXATION, supra note 107, at 3, 5; RABINOWITZ, supra note 104, at 19-20.
118. Wenzer, supra note 117, at 9 ("The unstated new formula went something like this:
egalitarian democracy means private acquisition, which means inequality of wealth, which
means a legitimated hierarchy of privilege, which is good.").
119. HELLMAN, supra note 107, at 31 ("This, then, is the remedy for the unjust and un-
equal distribution of wealth apparent in modern civilization, and for all the evils which flow
from it: We must make land common property." (quoting GEORGE, supra note 105, at 328)).
120. HELLMAN, supra note 107, at 225. See generally CRITICS OF HENRY GEORGE (Robert
V. Andelson ed., 1979). While George's ideas were ahead of the mainstream Progressive
movement, George was not a proponent of socialism manifested as government ownership.
George remained "[m]ore centrist than the socialists, [and he] could see virtue in a restruc-
tured, ethically inspired market economy." Wenzer, supra note 117, at 8. Moreover George
did not believe that the modern state could handle socialism "except by retrogression that
would involve anarchy and perhaps barbarism." GEORGE, supra note 105, at 321. Although
George was not a socialist, a strong sense of civic idealism clearly pervades his writing. For
example, he writes, "[c]ivilization, as it progresses, requires a higher conscience, a keener
sense of justice, a warmer brotherhood, a wider, loftier, truer public spirit. Failing these,
civilization must pass into destruction." HENRY GEORGE, SOCIAL PROBLEMS 241 (Robert
Shalkenberg Foundation 1953) (1883).
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bid up values within developed areas, builders may push for hous-
ing on the undeveloped outskirts of communities. New
construction on the outer edges of communities, often called
"sprawl," is a topic of much concern to communities wrestling with




Local legal authority to legislate against speculation is clearest
when the state has passed specific enabling legislation granting
such authority. Such a statute might be broadly worded, merely
authorizing municipalities to engage in anti-speculation legislation
without detailing the specifics of the ordinance. A legitimate grant
of authority also could be included within a statute giving munici-
122palities the power to address affordable housing issues.
Additionally, some states require municipalities to engage in com-
prehensive land use planning efforts.1 2 This comprehensive plan
sometimes requires a municipality to describe the specific efforts it
plans to undertake to remove existing barriers to affordable hous-
ing and to create new affordable housing units.24 Within the
comprehensive planning statute, state legislators could specifically
authorize municipalities to use anti-speculation measures, among
other tools, to further affordable housing goals.
A state statute specifically dedicated to governing this authority
could also guide municipalities more clearly. It could detail the
121. See, e.g., Michael Lewyn, Suburban Sprawl: Not Just an Environmental Issue, 84 MARQ.
L. REv. 301, 301-04 (2000) (defining sprawl and suggesting solutions).
122. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-2 (2004) ("The zoning commission of each city,
town or borough is authorized to regulate, within the limits of such municipality, the height,
number of stories and size of buildings and other structures .... Such regulations shall also
promote housing choice and economic diversity in housing, including housing for both low
and moderate income households."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 166.04151 (West 2004) (authorizing
the use of inclusionary zoning to create affordable housing); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3202
(West 2004) (encouraging the use of innovative land development regulations); N.Y. GEN.
Ciry LAW § 28-a (McKinney 2003) ("It is the intent of the legislature to encourage, but not
to require, the preparation and adoption of a comprehensive plan .... The city compre-
hensive plan may include the following topics at the level of detail adapted to the special
requirements of the city: ... [e]xisting housing resources and future housing needs, includ-
ing affordable housing.").
123. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65350 (West 1997).
124. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE §65583(a)(1)-(8) (West 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 163.3177(6) (f) (1) (West 2004).
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scope and limitations of local legislation on the issue, and provide
the sole means of dispute resolution resulting from the legislation's
application. An existing state agency, such as an agency currently
involved in comprehensive land use planning, economic develop-
ment, or even the state real estate division, could monitor and
enforce the statute's provisions.
B. Local or Regional Level Legislation
Municipalities within the same state may experience different
levels of speculative investment resulting in different economic,
social, and political pressures. Depending on the level of specula-
tion in a community, a local task force might publish a report
outlining measures to address increased growth and limited access
to affordable housing."5 Similarly, local workers and advocacy
groups might pressure city and county politicians to address local
affordable housing needs. As a result of particular city needs, a city
could enact anti-speculation measures before, or with the purpose
of encouraging, the development of state legislative attention to
the issue.
Cities have relatively limited legal authority under our system of
local government. 2 6 Cities are created by states, and are conse-
quently limited by state power.127 Those cities enjoying the broadest
degree of legal autonomy, home rule cities, are generally able to
freely legislate on issues of purely local concern.2 2 The procedure
125. See, e.g., Home Builders Ass'n of N. Cal. v. Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 62 (Ct. App.
2001) (noting that the city affordable housing task force proposed an inclusionary zoning
ordinance to address affordable housing).
126. Cities do not have any independent legal status. They are creatures of the state that
exercise delegated power or administer power where needed at the local, rather than state,
level. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Government Law, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1990). Dillon's Rule, a rule of statutory construction in determining
the scope of city power, limits city power to those powers expressly granted, powers that can
be implied from express powers, and powers essential to city purposes. Id. at 8. Briffault
notes that Dillon's Rule has been abolished in many states. Id.
127. For discussions of cities' relative powerlessness, see generally Gerald E. Frug, City as
a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1059, 1062 (1980);Joan C. Williams, The Invention of the
Municipal Corporation: A Case Study in Legal Change, 34 Am. U. L. REv. 369 (1985). Frug sug-
gests regional governments might address the relative powerlessness of cities to decide
housing policy in the face of rapidly escalating development. Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional
Government, 115 HARv. L. REV. 1763, 1832 (2002).
128. Local laws generally prevail over state laws on purely local issues. See, e.g., COLO.
CONST. art. XX, § 6. Cities may legislate on issues of mixed local and statewide concern so
long as there is no conflicting state statute or constitutional prohibition. See, e.g., Northglenn
v. Ibarra, 62 P.3d 151, 156 (Colo. 2003). For recent assessments and critiques of home rule,
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for obtaining home rule status is usually described in statutory and
constitutional provisions, and commonly involves the drafting of a
home rule city charter.29 How cities are able to exercise home rule
powers differs among states. In states that do not authorize home
rule powers, city powers are limited to express and implied grants
of authority from the state.'
In theory, it should be easier for cities enjoying home rule pow-
ers than those that do not to pass such legislation even in the
absence of state statutory authority. However some courts have
been hostile to home rule cities' efforts to address local housing
issues in innovative ways. Consequently, the authority of home
rule cities to enact anti-speculation measures is not clear. The abil-
ity of non-home rule cities to enact anti-speculation legislation is
likewise uncertain without express statutory authorization.
In general, a court evaluating a city's authority to enact such
measures will be more likely to uphold those ordinances it inter-
prets to be applications of a municipality's traditional land use
authority. If a court considers anti-speculation measures to be ex-
amples of economic legislation, or otherwise different from
traditional land use regulation, the measures will likely be struck
down. Courts have not yet had the opportunity to consider the le-
gality of an anti-speculation ordinance. However, judicial review of
other local efforts to create or maintain affordable housing, involv-
ing inclusionary zoning and rent control, suggest insight into the
issues central to the success of an anti-speculation ordinance.
In Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, L.L.C,3 2 the Colo-
rado Supreme Court struck down a locally enacted ordinance
requiring developers to provide affordable housing for forty per-
cent of new employees generated by new developments. The court
concluded that the ordinance reached issues of mixed state and
local concern, and therefore was preempted by a state statute on
rent control restricting legislation by local municipalities. 33 Not
only did the court broadly interpret the state rent control statute,
but it also characterized this affordable housing ordinance as
"economic legislation" rather than as an exercise of traditional
land use regulation.3 4 By characterizing it as economic legislation,
see generally David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255 (2003); Richard
Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-first Century, 36 URB. LAW. 253 (2004).
129. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XI, §§ 3-5.
130. See supra note 126.
131. See infra notes 132-149 and accompanying text.
132. Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, L.L.C, 3 P.3d 30 (Colo. 2000).
133. Id. at 33-34.
134. Id. at 39 n.9.
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the court shifted the scope of the ordinance from the traditional,
purely local purview of land use regulation to a much broader
category of general economic relationships.
The court accomplished this shift by concluding that the ordi-
nance "does not dictate permissible uses of real property; rather, it
dictates the rate at which the property may be used for a permissi-
ble purpose."135 Though developers could satisfy the inclusionary
housing ordinance without creating on-site affordable units, when
developers chose to build on-site affordable units the ordinance
required that tenants in those units be charged less than the mar-
ket rent.'36 Even if the ordinance arguably conflicted with the state
rent control statute,17 the ordinance might have been saved if the
issue of affordable housing in Telluride was viewed as a purely local
concern. The court characterized affordable housing as having
mixed state and local components.
[T] he state has a legitimate interest in preserving investment
capital in the rental market, ensuring stable quantity and
quality of housing, maintaining tax revenues generated by
rental properties, and protecting the state's overall economic
health. Telluride, on the other hand, has a valid interest in
controlling land use, reducing regional traffic congestion and
air pollution, containing sprawl, preserving a sense of com-
munity, and improving the quality of life of the Town's
employees.
38
Although the basic characterization of affordable housing as
both a state and local issue is not inconsistent with the views of af-
fordable housing supporters, the court's characterization subverts
attempts by local governments to be involved in affordable housing
efforts. States should indeed engage in affirmative efforts to create
and coordinate affordable housing opportunities. But state efforts
should supplement and enhance local efforts, not thwart them.
135. Id.
136. Developers could dedicate land to the town of Telluride to be used for affordable
housing, or developers could pay fees for affordable housing elsewhere in lieu of reserving
affordable units on site. Id. at 33-34.
137. The dissent argued that the Telluride ordinance was enacted for entirely different
public policy considerations than traditional rent control ordinances, and that the two apply
in different manners. For example, the Telluride ordinance only applied to new construc-
tion and responded to growth pressures caused by increased capital investment. Rent
control, on the other hand, typically exempted new construction and responded to con-
cerns of decreased capital investment. Id. at 40-43 (Mullarkey, M., dissenting).
138. Id. at 39 (majority opinion).
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The court in Telluride was concerned about the removal of hous-
ing from the "competitive marketplace"139 and the ripple effect on
adjacent jurisdictions caused by local interventions in the housing
market.1 40 Although state planning efforts should be attentive to
the interrelationships among jurisdictions, the dissent in Telluride
rightly argues that focusing on this so-called ripple effect "strikes at
the fundamental premise of land use planning, zoning, and devel-
opment regulations by exalting free operation of the housing
market over the police power of local government to shape the de-
sign of a community."
14
1
One implication of the approach of the Telluride court is that
states containing statutes regulating rent control might be more
difficult sites for locally initiated anti-speculation legislation.1
42
Other state courts may be tempted to compare the restrictions in a
local anti-speculation ordinance to the restrictions on property use
and resale typically created by a local rent control ordinance. 43 On
its face, an anti-speculation ordinance does not require the rental
of property, or regulate the rate at which an owner chooses to rent
her property. But an anti-speculation ordinance does require that
an owner temporarily forego some market value that, without the
regulation, the owner could immediately capture.
In addition to the specter of rent control, another obstacle
raised by the reasoning of the court in Telluride is the transforma-
tion of a land use regulation, which is almost universally perceived
as a local power, into a regulation affecting important state inter-
ests beyond the local sphere. In contrast, a New York court avoided
this transformation and found that a town's ordinance requiring
owner occupancy as a prerequisite for permission to rent accessory
apartments was within the town's home rule powers.4 4 This ordi-
nance, which was designed to increase affordable housing and
139. Id. at 36.
140. Id. at 38 ("Ordinances like Telluride's can change the dynamics of supply and de-
mand in an important sector of the economy-the housing market. A consistent prohibition
on rent control encourages investment in the rental market and the maintenance of high
quality rental units.").
141. Id. at 46 (Mullarkey, M., dissenting).
142. Id. at 39 (majority opinion). The Telluride court points to Arizona, Massachusetts,
and Oregon as states that have prohibited cities from imposing rent control ordinances and
declared rent control to be a statewide concern. Id. (citing ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1329
(2000); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40P, § 5 (2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 91.225 (2003)). These
statutes do not prevent cities from imposing rental restrictions when they have contributed
some subsidy amount to the project.
143. Rent control statutes generally are permissible exercises of government authority.
Pennell v. SanJose, 485 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1987).
144. Kasper v. Brookhaven, 535 N.Y.S.2d 621, 622-23 (App. Div. 1988); see also infra
notes 188-195 and accompanying text (discussing Kasper).
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maintain a certain community character, fell within the town's tra-
ditional land use powers of zoning.1 45 An individual city's allowance
of accessory units for some homes and not others certainly has an
effect on the overall rental market and the rental market of nearby
jurisdictions. Unlike the court in Telluride, however, this court was
not overly concerned with pernicious statewide effects.
1 46
The owner occupancy restriction, however, arguably affects a
more traditional land use issue-the use of property-and the
economic effects of the regulation are secondary. This suggests
that an anti-speculation ordinance would also be defensible by ref-
erences to its promotion of a certain community character. Such
an ordinance would arguably promote community stability and
protect against the harms caused by large numbers of vacant
houses awaiting rental.
In some instances, this transformation may not be fatal. A Colo-
rado court upheld an over-occupancy ordinance, fining landlords
for renting houses to too many students at one time, as valid under
Boulder's home rule power. 47 The court generally considered the
ordinance to be an expression of the city's zoning power, but the
court also analyzed the ordinance under the assumption that it
implicated broader statewide issues of criminal punishment.'4
Landlords argued that statewide issues were involved insofar as the
ordinance required findings of a landlord's level of culpability, and
that this determination should rest on state statutes, rather than
local definitions. 149 This potential for transformation from local to
statewide concern could create conflicts with preexisting state stat-
utes, as is seen in Telluride, or suggest that a municipality has not
been granted the power in the first instance. The latter suggestion,
that the municipality lacks an express statutory grant of power, is of
more concern in non-home rule states.
This fear is well founded given the Virginia case, Board of Supervi-
sors v. DeGroff Enterprises.'50 In DeGroff the Supreme Court of
Virginia found that the City of Fairfax had exceeded its police
power authority in enacting an ordinance requiring that fifteen
percent of housing units in a new development be made affordable
145. Kasper, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 622-23.
146. See supra notes 140-141 and accompanying text.
147. Boulder County Apartment Ass'n v. Boulder, 97 P.3d 332, 337 (Colo. Ct. App.
2004).
148. The court found that the ordinance did not conflict with state criminal statutes. Id.
at 336-37.
149. Id.
150. Bd. of Supervisors v. DeGroff Enters., 198 S.E.2d 600, 602 (Va. 1973). The Virginia
Supreme Court stated that it was more concerned that the ordinance constituted a taking
under state law. Id. For a discussion of takings issues, see infra Part ME.
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to persons of lower income. 51 The court found the city "ex-
ceed[ed] the authority granted by the enabling act to the local
governing body because [the ordinance] is socio-economic zoning
and attempts to control the compensation for the use of land and
the improvements thereon."52 Other language in the decision sug-
gests that the court would be hostile to locally enacted anti-
speculation legislation to the extent that it aimed to "include [or]
exclude any particular socio-economic group.""'3
An anti-speculation ordinance, in its defense, would not target
any particular population, and would instead impose general hous-
ing restrictions on any number of socio-economic groups.
Furthermore, some states have embraced inclusionary zoning
schemes, giving hope to the possibility that an anti-speculation or-
dinance would be similarly accepted. New Jersey has long
employed a well-known inclusionary zoning regime based on its
decisions in the Mount Laurel series of cases.15 4 Other states and cit-
ies have conducted their own inclusionary zoning experiments as
well. 55 For example, twenty percent of the localities in California
have implemented some type of inclusionary zoning. 56
C. Due Process
The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution declares
that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws."'57 This amendment
requires the provision of both procedural and substantive due
151. DeGroffEnters., 198 S.E.2d at 602.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. The Mount Laurel litigation involved several cases: S. Burlington County NAACP v.
Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975) (Mount Laurel I); S. Burlington County NAACP v.
Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983) (Mount Laurel II); and Hills Dev. Co. v. Bernard,
510 A.2d 621 (N.J. 1986). Following the Mount Laurel litigation, the NewJersey Fair Housing
Act of 1985 created the Council on Affordable Housing to administer affordable housing
fair share requirements. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-301 to -329 (West 2001). See generally Nico
Calavita et al., supra note 38 (comparing the inclusionary zoning approaches of California
and New Jersey); John M. Payne, Reconstructing the Constitutional Theory of Mount Laurel II, 3
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 555 (2000) (exploring connections between the Mount Laurel doc-
trine and a state constitutional right to shelter).
155. See Cecily T. Talbert & Nadia L. Costa, Current Issues in Inclusionary Zoning, 36 URB.
LAw. 557, 558 (2004); Ehrlich, supra note 38, at 972-73 (citing examples in Maryland, Mas-
sachusetts, Illinois and several other states). See generally Padilla, supra note 38.
156. Talbert & Costa, supra note 155, at 558.
157. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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process. A local government should be able to satisfy procedural
due process, including notice and hearing, by complying with state
or local procedures for enacting valid local legislation. A local gov-
ernment would violate substantive due process principles by
enacting an ordinance that is arbitrary, unreasonable or capri-
cious.1 58 Similarly, an ordinance that bears no substantial relation to
public health, safety, morals or the general welfare will fail under
substantive due process analysis.
State cases sometimes invalidated early attempts at zoning on
substantive due process grounds, concluding that zoning itself rep-
resented an arbitrary interference in the housing market.
160
However the U.S. Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co.'61 validated zoning generally under due process.
Federal courts, hesitant to become a sort of super zoning board,
have increasingly limited their review of due process challenges of
state land use legislation.162 In assessing due process violations, fed-
eral courts give substantial deference to legislative determinations,
overturning these determinations only in instances of bad faith,
arbitrary and capricious application, or absence of a rational rela-
tionship to health, safety, morals or general welfare. 1 3 Local
governments are given wide latitude in the exercise of the police
164
power.
158. See Allen v. North Hempstead, 478 N.Y.S.2d 919, 923 (App. Div. 1984) (striking
down an ordinance requiring one year of town residency to qualify for housing in the
"Golden Age Residence District" because it excluded neighboring elderly residents).
159. See Fox v. Bay Harbor Islands, 450 So. 2d 559, 561 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (hold-
ing that an ordinance requiring the ground floor apartment of an apartment building be
occupied by a maintenance person bears no relationship to public health, safety, morals or
public welfare).
160. See, e.g., Goldman v. Crowther, 128 A. 50, 60 (Md. 1925).
161. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). The Euclid Court
noted that applications of land use restrictions to particular landowners might run afoul of
due process principles, and made good on that warning several years later. See Nectow v.
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
162. See, e.g., Brian W. Blaesser, Substantive Due Process Protection at the Outer Margins of
Municipal Behavior, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 583, 594-95 (2000) (discussing varying ap-
proaches of circuits); Parna A. Mehrbani, Comment, Substantive Due Process Claims in the
Land-Use Context: The Need for a Simple and Intelligent Standard of Review, 35 ENVTL. L. 209, 213
(2005).
163. Applying the anti-speculation ordinance to some purchasers and not others may
raise state or federal equal protections concerns in addition to due process concerns. Fa-
cially, the ordinance does not trigger strict scrutiny review by making distinctions based on
suspect classifications. Additionally, the ordinance does not likely burden a fundamental
interest. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972).
164. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (noting that the public welfare
considerations of the police power are "broad and inclusive" and "[t ] he values it represents
are spiritual as well as physical").
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While most states use a "rational relationship" standard to evalu-
ate due process land use claims,' other state courts impose a more
exacting standard, even if the legislation in question does not af-
fect a suspect classification or fundamental interest. These courts
look for a "real and substantial" relationship between the legisla-
tion and the exercise of police power.'66 Some courts may even
impose a balancing test weighing the public benefit of the legisla-
tion with the private burden suffered by a particular landowner.
167
Anti-speculation measures are more likely to be upheld if they
are supported by substantial findings tying speculative purchases to
harms of residential character. Evidence supporting such a connec-
tion could include a proliferation of rental and vacant houses
within traditionally owner occupied neighborhoods caused by
speculators looking for tenants. While affordable housing remains
a goal of the ordinance, the promotion of residential character, a
more standard purpose of traditional land use regulation, is an ad-
ditional purpose. The promotion of residential character may
provide stronger grounds for responding to due process concerns.
It is often said that land use regulations legitimately address the
use rather than the user of property, so courts are generally suspi-
cious of laws attempting to regulate who may occupy property
rather than what uses may be made of certain property.168
165. See Zuckerman v. Hadley, 813 N.E.2d 843, 848 (Mass. 2004) ("[D]ue process re-
quires that a zoning bylaw bear a rational relation to a legitimate zoning purpose."); Dow v.
Effingham, 803 A.2d 1059, 1064 (N.H. 2002) (declining to impose a "fair and substantial
relationship" standard in a due process claim where the landowner claimed that "the right
to own, use, and enjoy one's property is considered a fundamental personal right"); Laugh-
ter v. Bd. of County Comm'rs for Sweetwater County, 110 P.3d 875, 887-88 (Wyo. 2005)
(sustaining regulation if it is of debatable reasonableness or bears a rational relationship to a
legitimate public purpose).
166. See Tyrone v. Tyrone, L.L.C., 565 S.E.2d 806 (Ga. 2002); Hanna v. Chicago, 771
N.E.2d 13, 22 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). In Hanna, the court listed six factors used to determine
whether an ordinance violates substantive due process principles:
(1) the existing uses and zoning of nearby property; (2) the extent to which property
values are diminished by the particular zoning restrictions; (3) the extent to which
the destruction of property values of the plaintiff promotes the health, safety, morals
or general welfare of the public; (4) the relative gain to the public as compared to
the hardship imposed upon the individual property owner; (5) the suitability of the
subject property for the zoned purposes; and (6) the length of time the property has
been vacant as zoned considered in the context of land development in the area in
the vicinity of the subject property.
Hanna, 771 N.E.2d at 22. See also ARDEN H. RATHKOPF & DOREN A. RATHKOPF, RATHKOPF'S
THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 3.16, at 3-41 to 3-50 (Edward H. Ziegler ed., 2005)
(discussing cases employing a "real and substantial relationship" test).
167. See, e.g., Dow, 803 A.2d at 1065-67 (stating that a balancing test is appropriate in "as
applied" due process claims but the instant case did not present an "as applied" issue).
168. See, e.g., Kasper v. Brookhaven, 535 N.Y.S.2d 621 (App. Div. 1988).
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Anti-speculation provisions regulating sales do not directly affect
the user of the property, given that a particular owner is permitted
to occupy the property herself, rent it to others, or let the property
lie vacant. However, anti-speculation measures employing owner
occupancy restrictions might affect the user of the property and
thus be subject to higher scrutiny.'6 9
D. Restraints on Alienation
The Restatement (Third) of Property focuses on reasonableness
as a standard for determining whether a direct restraint on alien-
ation is valid, weighing the utility of the restraint against any
injurious consequences arising from the enforcement of the re-
straint. 70 Common uses of restraints on alienation outlined in the
Comments to the Restatement include preserving affordable hous-
ing, keeping land within families, controlling entry into
cooperatives, condominiums, subsidized housing, and retirement
communities that have financial and other special qualifications
for entry, maintaining land for conservation and charitable pur-
poses, and maintaining a level of owner occupancy for certain
financing requirements. 7' An overarching concern of alienability
restrictions is the effect of any limitation on the operation of a free
market in land ownership and development. Restraints can ad-
versely impact the development and improvement of land, impede
owners' mobility, and subjugate current ambitions to those of past
172owners.
After beginning with a rather broad review of the validity of re-
straints on alienation, the Restatement goes on to note the
importance of an individual restraint's qualities, such as the re-
straint's nature, extent, and duration.'"3 The Restatement also
notes the context in which the restraint appears. A restraint on
alienation in a condominium development may require a different
evaluation than an equivalent restraint appearing in a neighbor-
hood of single-family detached housing. Similarly, restraints are
more likely to be upheld in certain housing subsets, such as in the
preservation of affordability in publicly or privately subsidized
169. See infra Part V (discussing an owner occupancy alternative).
170. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.4 (2000).
171. Id.
172. Id. at cmt. c.
173. Id.
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housing,74 or to achieve certain goals within condominium com-
munities.1
5
One general conclusion of the following discussion is that re-
strictions on what courts consider more primary characteristics of
homeownership will be more closely scrutinized than restrictions
on activities considered supplementary to ownership. There is also
broad judicial deference to the preservation of the residential
character of neighborhoods, to a particular city's aversion to out-
side investment interests and their effects on the residential
character, and deference to local legislative decisions generally.
Gangemi v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Fairfield'76 provides one ex-
ample of the factors a court considers in determining the validity
of a restraint on alienation. Gangemi involved a restraint on alien-
ation narrowly applied to a single house. Homeowners successfully
challenged a local zoning board's decision to grant a variance on
the condition that a house remain owner occupied. In overturning
the no-rental condition, the court reiterated the long-standing val-
ues of free alienability of property.' 7 The court emphasized that
surrounding property owners were not similarly restricted, thereby
undermining any strong public purpose rationales of the ordi-
nance and heightening the magnitude of devaluation to the
subject property. 17 The court noted that the economic choices in-
cident to property ownership consist of occupying, renting, or
selling, and thus the no-rental condition deprived the owners of
one incident (renting) and significantly impaired another incident
174. See, e.g., Oceanside v. McKenna, 264 Cal. Rptr. 275, 280-81 (Ct. App. 1989) (up-
holding resale restrictions on a locally subsidized, low-income unit); id. at 279 ("We can take
judicial notice that over the past two decades ... real estate prices in California have been
rising rapidly and the market has attracted a wide range of investments .... Thus, the dis-
puted restrictions ... maintain[] a stabilized community of low and moderate income
residents and discourag[e] speculation by real estate investors."); Martin v. Villa Roma, Inc.,
182 Cal. Rptr. 382, 383-84 (Ct. App. 1982) (upholding resale restrictions on federally subsi-
dized units in a low-income cooperative).
175. A condominium association's right of first refusal on the sale of units to ensure "a
community of congenial residents" was upheld in Chianese v. Culley, 397 F. Supp. 1344, 1346
(S.D. Fla. 1975). See also Franklin v. Spadafora, 447 N.E.2d 1244, 1247 (Mass. 1983) (declar-
ing the promotion of owner occupancy a proper purpose of a condominium provision
restricting the number of units any one person could own). But see Aquarian Foundation,
Inc. v. Sholom House, Inc., 448 So. 2d 1166, 1169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (invalidating a
clause permitting condominium association to withhold approval of buyer without corre-
sponding obligation to purchase unit or provide alternate buyer).
176. Gangemi v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Fairfield, 763 A.2d 1011 (Conn. 2001).
177. Id. at 1015 ("[T]he rule against direct restraints on alienation is an old one, going
back to the fifteenth century or perhaps even earlier." (citing JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES
KRIER, PROPERTY 223 (3d ed. 1993))).
178. Gangemi, 763 A.2d at 1011, 1017.
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(selling) due to the limited number of buyers of an occupancy re-
stricted unit.79
On the other hand, the dissent argued for a broad reading of
the general principle that zoning regulates the use of land and not
the user. From this perspective, a "no-rental" condition is a legiti-
mate exercise of the police power because it applies to the use of
the land and not to particular occupants.1
8
1
The restriction on an individual homeowner in Gangemi can be
contrasted with a generally applied city ordinance like one intro-
duced in Provo, Utah. Like many other university towns, Provo
struggles with the balance between providing student housing and
maintaining the residential character of the surrounding commu-
nity. A zoning overlay ordinance in Provo allowed owners to rent
homes as well as adjacent, accessory apartments to university stu-
dents.' There was no restriction on the number of homes a
person could own. Under fear of outside investors purchasing
homes and turning them into chiefly rental housing for students,
local homeowners successfully encouraged the Provo City Munici-
pal Council to enact a new ordinance requiring owner occupancy
of a primary home in order to rent out an accessory dwelling.' 2
The court, in Anderson v. Provo City Corp., upheld the validity of
this ordinance under summary judgment.83 Discussing the general
principle that a zoning ordinance may regulate only land use, not
the ownership of land or a particular user, the court concluded
that the "no-rental" condition regulated an owner's supplementary
use of her property rather than a primary use, and therefore was a
permissible exercise of the city's land use police powers.1 4 Non-
179. Id. at 1016.
180. Id. at 1023-25. The dissent noted that jurisdictions are split on the question of
whether a "no-rental" condition is valid. Id. at 1023-24 (Sullivan, J., dissenting). Compare
Ewing v. Carmel-by-the-Sea, 286 Cal. Rptr. 382, 383, 393 (Ct. App. 1991) (upholding ordi-
nance restricting rental of residential property under thirty days), with United Prop. Owners
Ass'n of Belmar v. Belmar, 447 A.2d 933 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982) (invalidating ordi-
nance restricting temporary and seasonal rentals).
The Gangemi dissent also discussed discrimination against renters and unlawful restraints
on alienation arguing that the plaintiffs did not have standing to address rental discrimina-
tion claims and that any alienation restraints are outweighed by important public policy
considerations. Gangemi, 763 A.2d at 1028-30 (Sullivan,J., dissenting).
181. Anderson v. Provo City Corp., 108 P.3d 701, 704 (Utah 2005).
182. Id. at 704-05. The ordinance contained an exception to owner occupancy for "a
bona fide, temporary absence of three years or less for activities such as temporary job as-
signments, sabbaticals, or voluntary service." Id. at 709. The court acknowledged that though
this exception may be based on consideration of the missionary service of members of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, it is generally applicable and did not constitute
any discriminatory religious tailoring. Id.
183. Id. at 710.
184. Id. at 706.
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occupying owners were free to rent out the primary premises, but
they could not engage in the supplementary activity of renting out
an accessory dwelling. The court upheld the restriction in spite of
arguments that the ordinance impermissibly subjected owner and
non-owner classes to different treatment,"" was an impermissible
indirect restraint on alienation, 's and violated the right to travel
under the U.S. Constitution. '87
Similarly, the court in Kasper v. Town of Brookhaven"5 5 upheld an
owner occupancy requirement for accessory rental apartments, like
the one in Provo, against arguments that the ordinance exceeded
the town's land use powers, created impermissible distinctions be-
tween owners and non-owners, and impermissibly regulated the
users of property rather than the uses.'89 This ordinance was in-
tended to create housing opportunities for persons of low and
moderate income and to generate additional economic support for
existing residents of the town with limited incomes. ' 90
The town struggled between two competing interests when im-
plementing this ordinance. On the one hand, the town sought to
preserve the residential, single-family character of the affected zon-
ing districts.'91 On the other hand, the ordinance had an explicit
goal of aiding economically limited homeowner occupants.' 92 The
court reasoned that it was permissible for the town to draw a line
between homeowner occupants and investor owners on the theory
that if investor owners were permitted to take advantage of the
same accessory apartment opportunity, they might do so in large
numbers and preclude homeowner occupants from doing the
same due to the concentration restrictions of the ordinance.9 3
Choosing between resident and non-resident owners in this
situation might have been accomplished on a first-come,
185. Id. at 707-10. The court analyzed the restriction under the uniform operation of
laws provision of article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution, which forbids classifications
under the law based on insufficient justifications. Id. The court concluded that preserving
the character of a single family neighborhood by restricting absentee landlords was a legiti-
mate rationale. Id. at 708.
186. Acknowledging that the restraint may affect property values, the court concluded
that non-occupying owners could still rent their primary residence and that the city's inter-
est in preserving the residential character of the neighborhood prevailed over any alienation
restraints. Id. at 710.
187. The court quickly concluded that the restriction had little impact on interstate
travel. Id.
188. Kasper v. Town of Brookhaven, 535 N.Y.S.2d 621 (App. Div. 1998).
189. Id. at 623.
190. Id. at 622.
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first-served basis, by lottery, or by some other "neutral" means. The
ordinance, however, need only bear a rational relationship to a le-
gitimate governmental goal. The court emphasized that it is not for
courts to determine whether a particular ordinance is the best or
most efficient means of achieving a certain goal.194 Similarly, no fac-
tual determination at trial was required to test the likelihood or
reasonableness of the town's conclusion that owner occupancy
would produce more favorable results for the community.9
Laws facilitating the construction of accessory units often in-
crease affordable housing opportunities through the provision of
relatively inexpensive rental units. Communities sometimes fear
the increased population density caused by accessory units and the
potential changes to neighborhood character. The California legis-
lature balanced these competing interests in a statute encouraging
local governments to accept accessory homes under appropriate
local regulation, or requiring local governments to grant a condi-
tional use permit for accessory units under certain statutory
conditions. 196 The statute requires owner occupancy of the primary
unit "to protect neighborhood stability and the character of exist-
ing family neighborhoods and to discourage speculation and
absentee ownership."
197
Anti-speculation measures attempt to achieve a similar balance
between maintaining affordable housing and maintaining the
character of family neighborhoods. The differences between
Gangemi and Provo City Corp. suggest that a generally applicable re-
straint on alienation will be more successful than one targeted at a
particular home. Furthermore, the courts approved of local efforts
to treat outside investors less favorably than owner occupants for
fear of speculation and attendant consequences to the residential
character of neighborhoods.
Prohibiting an outside investor who owns both a house and an
accessory dwelling from renting one of the properties is not an in-
194. Id. at 625; see also Spilka v. Inlet, 778 N.Y.S.2d 222, 225 (App. Div. 2004) (finding an
ordinance amendment requiring a special use permit to rent non-owner occupied resi-
dences for four or more months, rationally related to a legitimate governmental goal and
not arbitrary, discriminatory or illegal: "The amendment identified many legitimate gov-
ernmental purposes for its enactment, including preserving aesthetic integrity in residential
neighborhoods, encouraging residential property maintenance, prevention of neighbor-
hood blight, protecting residential property values, permitting efficient use of defendant's
dwellings to provide economic support to residents, and enhancing the quality of life in
residential neighborhoods").
195. Kasper, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 627.
196. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65852.2 (West 1997).
197. Sounhein v. San Dimas, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 290, 295 (Ct. App. 1996) (interpreting the
statute to require ongoing owner occupancy, and not merely owner occupancy at the time of
application for the conditional permit).
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significant restraint. The accessory dwelling is rendered valueless if
the investor cannot move into one of the other units.'9 8 Under an
anti-speculation ordinance, on the other hand, an investor would
always retain some significant value in the underlying house. It can
be lived in or rented. Although it cannot be sold immediately, the
three-year resale limitation does not on its face appear to be an
unreasonable restriction according to the Restatement. Lastly, the
restriction would be for a very important purpose-the promotion
of affordable housing. Under these circumstances, an anti-
speculation ordinance seems likely to survive an attack as an
impermissible restraint on alienation.
E. Takings
A property owner subject to an anti-speculation ordinance may
claim that her property has been taken for public use without just
compensation that is required by the Fifth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution and similar provisions in state constitutions.'9 An
owner should not be able to invoke the heightened scrutiny of fed-
eral takings claims developed in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission2 00 and Dolan v. City of Tigard 2 1 to address an anti-
speculation ordinance. These exactions2  cases are applicable
when local governments impose conditions on individual devel-
opment applications. For example, the California Court of Appeal
refused to apply the heightened scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan in a
198. It is possible that the investor could sell the accessory unit separately, presumably
to an owner occupier neighbor, if local land use regulations permit such a transfer.
199. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
200. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). In Nollan, the Court con-
cluded that a government-imposed lateral easement running along the adjacent beachfront
of homeowners attempting to construct a larger home did not meet a sufficient relationship,
or nexus, between the imposed condition and the problem to be alleviated. Id. at 836.
201. Dolan v. City of Tigrad, 512 U.S. 374 (1992). In Dolan, the local government
sought unsuccessfully to condition the razing and enlargement of a plumbing and supply
store on the dedication of two portions of the owner's land: one portion that lay within a
floodplain and a second portion for the benefit of a bicycle path. The Court held that, in
addition to Nollan nexus requirements, local governments must also demonstrate a "rough
proportionality" between the benefit of the imposed condition and the harm caused by the
new development. Id. at 391. Between the tests of nexus and rough proportionality, local
governments would find it difficult to require developers to dedicate land for uses such as
parks and schools.
202. The term "exaction" describes a condition or set of conditions a local government
imposes on a landowner before the local government will grant a specific land use approval.
These conditions are not generally outlined in local regulations, but instead are imposed ad
hoc on landowners.
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facial challenge to an inclusionary zoning ordinance, determining
that heightened scrutiny is inappropriate for "legislation that is
generally applicable. 2 0 3 Similarly, anti-speculation measures are
generally enacted legislation applying to an entire community in-
stead of ad hoc requirements faced only by one individual.
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Lingle v. Chevron, an anti-
speculation ordinance is no longer vulnerable to a takings claim
based on the argument that its methods of achieving affordable
housing do not substantially advance a legitimate state interest.
204
Before Lingle, an anti-speculation ordinance could be considered
too circumlocutory a method to permissibly achieve affordable
housing goals.0
A takings challenge under an anti-speculation ordinance is also
not likely to fall within the categorical takings described by a physi-
cal appropriation or a loss of all economic use.06 Substantial value
remains in a property containing a resale restriction. Renting, for
example, constitutes significant value, as does living on the prop-
erty. Similarly, nothing in the ordinance constitutes a physical
appropriation of property.
Although significant economic value may remain in property
subject to regulation (thus failing the Lucas categorical taking test),
a court could nevertheless conclude that property owners are enti-
tled to compensation by evaluating the ordinance under the
balancing test articulated in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of
New York. °7 Much of the justification for compensating partial regu-
203. Home Builders Ass'n of N. Cal. v. Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 60, 66 (Ct. App. 2001);
see also San Remo Hotel v. San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 103 (2002) (declining to apply height-
ened scrutiny to a hotel conversion restriction).
204. Lingle v. Chevron, 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2087 (2005). The "substantially advancing a le-
gitimate state interest" takings test invalidated in Linge had developed from dicta in Agins v.
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). See also Edward J. Sullivan, Emperors and Clothes: The Genealogy
and Operation of the Agins' Tests, 33 URB. LAw. 343 (2001) (questioning the origin and appli-
cation of Agins to takings claims).
205. The "substantially advancing a legitimate state interest" takings test sometimes
proved fatal for rent control ordinances. See, e.g., Cashman v. Cotati, 374 F.3d 887 (9th Cir.
2004) (finding the rent control ordinance a taking because it did not substantially advance a
legitimate state interest), withdrawn on grant of reh'g, 415 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2005).
206. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992); Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
207. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); see also Palazzolo
v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001) ("Where a regulation places limitations on land
that fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may have
occurred, depending on a complex of factors including the regulation's economic effect on
the landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-
backed expectations, and the character of the government action."); Florida Rock Indus. v.
United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("Nothing in the language of the Fifth
Amendment compels a court to find a taking only when the Government divests the total
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latory takings derives from the idea that "forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole," is unfair.0 s Property
rights proponents have seized on this feeling of inequity and un-
fairness to advocate for compensable partial takings in judicial and
legislative forums.0 9
Courts have no exact formula for evaluating when the Armstrong
concepts of "fairness and justice" have been satisfied; they instead
rely on a case-by-case analysis.210 In this analysis, courts may con-
sider whether a regulation impermissibly burdens a limited
number of property owners when the public at large is benefited
and should contribute to the cost of regulation. In addition,
regulatory takings are governed by the multi-factor balancing test
articulated in Penn Central under which courts examine the eco-
nomic impact of the regulation, the character of the government
activity, and the reasonable investment-backed expectations of the
212property owner.
ownership of the property; the Fifth Amendment prohibits the uncompensated taking of
private property without reference to the owner's remaining property interests.").
208. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
often is cited for an earlier statement of the comparison between public and private benefit.
In 1922, he wrote, "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if a regulation goes
too far it will be recognized as a taking." Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
Determining when regulation has gone too far has turned out to be difficult to explain.
209. For examples of legislative attempts at the federal and state level to address takings
claims, see George Charles Homsy, The Land Use Planning Impacts of Moving "Partial Takings"
from Political Theory to Legal Reality, 37 URB. LAw. 269, 278-82 (2005). See also FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 70.001 (West 2005) (allowing the Legislature to provide "relief, or payment of compensa-
tion, when a new law, rule, regulation, or ordinance of the state or a political entity in the
state, as applied, unfairly affects real property"); TEx. GoV'T CODE ANN. §§ 2007.001-.045
(Vernon 2005) (restricting takings which devalue land by twenty-five percent but exempting
most municipal actions).
210. See, e.g., Cienega Gardens v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 434, 474 (2005) ("There is
no per se numerical limitation below which compensation is impermissible; courts must
weigh the economic impact with the other Penn Central factors to determine whetherjustice
and fairness require that a claimant be compensated.").
211. See Edward H. Ziegler, Partial Taking Claims, Ownership Rights in Land and Urban
Planning Practice: The Emerging Dichotomy Between Uncompensated Regulation and Compensable
Benefit Extraction Under the Fifth Amendment Taking Clause, 22 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
1, 4 (2002) (discussing the unfairness of singling out particular landowners to bear a dis-
proportionate cost burden for the benefit of the public).
212. Penn Cent., 439 U.S. at 124; see also Maritrans Inc. v. United States, 342 F.3d 1344,
1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding decline in property value of 13.1% due to Oil Pollution Act of
1990 insufficient to establish a taking because Maritrans was able to sell its tank barges for
substantially what they paid for them in addition to deriving income from them during the
phase-out period); Conti v. United States, 291 F.3d 1334, 1344-45 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding
alternative uses for the affected property precluded finding a regulatory taking related to
the government's ban on swordfishing).
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The approach by the Court of Federal Claims in Cienega Gardens
v. United States"' illustrates one approach that would make an anti-
speculation ordinance most vulnerable to a takings claim. In Cie-
nega Gardens, the Court of Federal Claims found that the
application of two federal statutes, the Emergency Low Income
Housing Preservation Act of 1987 (ELIHPA)2 14 and the Low-
Income Housing Preservation and Resident Homeownership Act
of 1990 (LIHPRHA), 15 caused a compensable taking by preventing
the owners of multifamily low-income housing buildings from pre-
216paying federally subsidized mortgages.
In applying the three-factor Penn Central balancing test, the
court first examined the character of the governmental action. The
court worried whether ELIHPA and LIHPRHA unfairly singled out
"specific property owners of low-income housing who had rights to
prepay and exit the program, and not all owners of rental proper-
ties or all taxpayers."2 1 7 The Court found that the administration of
these statutes, which denied a realistic opportunity to obtain the
requisite HUD approval to prepay the mortgages and exit the pro-
gram, "establish [ed] a character consistent with that of a taking."
2 1 8
Moreover, the Cienega Gardens court expressed discomfort with the
fact that ELIHPA and LIHPRHA did not regulate rental housing
generally.
2 19
In contrast, an anti-speculation ordinance would be generally
applicable to all residential housing in designated areas. Courts
could consider these ordinances either a part of the comprehen-
sive zoning scheme or a part of a local government's general
approach to affordable housing. Jurisdictions enacting such an or-
dinance should carefully develop full and partial waiver
opportunities given the concerns of the court in Cienega Gardens
regarding the realistic satisfaction of waiver provisions in the low-
income housing context.
213. Cienega Gardens, 67 Fed. Cl. 434.
214. Emergency Low Income Housing Preservation Act (ELIHPA) of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-242, § 202(a)(1), 101 Stat. 1877, 1877 (1988) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 17151
(2000)).
215. Low-Income Housing Preservation and Resident Act (LIHPRHA) of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-625, tit. VI, 104 Stat. 4249 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
216. These statutes required owners to solicit permission from the Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development (HUD) in order to prepay mortgages and release properties
from limitations on occupant income and similar restrictions. The owners complained that
this permission was virtually impossible to obtain, thus preventing owners from exercising
the prepayment option available to them at the beginning of their investment.
217. Cienega Gardens, 67 Fed. Cl. at 467.




Under the second prong of the Penn Central test, a court deter-
mining a property owner's distinct investment-backed expectations
will consider the owner's actual expectations in addition to the rea-
sonableness of those expectations. 2 ' The highly regulated field of
low-income housing arguably creates strong expectations of future
administrative and legislative restrictions on an owner's use of
property.22' However, the Cienega Gardens court focused on the
expectations of property owners participating in this particular low-
income housing program rather than those participating in
low-income housing productions generally. Under this view,
changes to the terms of the program resulted in substantial inter-
ference with the owners' investment-backed expectations.
A court could view an anti-speculation ordinance as being more
like a temporary development moratorium.2  Under this view, a
local government would be permitted to adopt temporary restric-
tions in order to better study growth management devices to
address speculation. An outright development moratorium rather
than a resale restriction would seem the more appropriate strategy
under this argument.
The final prong of the Penn Central test examines the magnitude
of the economic impact of the restriction on property owners. In
addition to the categorical taking articulated in Lucas, courts may
also find a taking in instances where the diminution in value is less
than one hundred percent. 23 To evaluate this diminution, the Cie-
nega Gardens court articulated three measures of economic
impact:2 4 comparing a claimant's return on equity with and with-
out the restriction, 2 ' evaluating a claimant's opportunity to recoup
or better his investment,226 and comparing the value taken from the
220. Id. at 471.
221. See Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 270 E3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("In this
case, which involves a business engaged in a highly regulated industry, the plaintiffs reason-
able investment-backed expectations are an especially important consideration in the
takings calculus. A party in Rith's position necessarily understands that it can expect the
regulatory regime to impose some restraints on its right[s] ....").
222. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres., Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 342
(2002) (holding local development moratorium valid against per se takings claim).
223. See, e.g., Cienega Gardens, 67 Fed. Cl. at 474 ("There is no per se numerical limita-
tion below which compensation is impermissible .. ") (emphasis omitted); see a/soYancey v.
United States, 915 F.2d 1534, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding a compensable taking in a sev-
enty-seven percent reduction in the value of a turkey flock due to a federal government
quarantine to control avian influenza).
224. Cienega Gardens, 67 Fed. Cl. at 474-75.
225. Id. at 475 (citing Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States, 373 F.3d 1177, 1188-89
(Fed. Cir. 2004)).
226. Id. (citing Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 18 E3d 1560, 1567 (Fed. Cir.
1994)).
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property with the value remaining in the property.27 Under each of
these measurements, a property owner affected by an anti-
speculation ordinance may incur significant economic detriment
during the three-year restriction period.
In a market with rapidly appreciating housing values, a property
owner may temporarily lose the opportunity to sell her unit at a
significant premium over her initial investment if she wishes to sell
within the first three years. As a result, her return on her initial in-
vestment will be lower during the restriction period. Similarly, she
may be temporarily restricted from liquidating her investment to
recoup its cost. Finally, in a heated market, the gains from selling
property may far exceed income derived from renting the same
property during the three-year period. An occupying homeowner
may come close to the potential monetary gain from selling the
property by refinancing, extracting the increased equity from the
property, and investing it elsewhere.
Under each of the three prongs of the Penn Central takings
analysis, as interpreted by Cienega Gardens, a property owner af-
fected by an anti-speculation ordinance may claim significant
harm. This analysis rests heavily on a weighing of public benefits
and private harms. To the extent that courts view the ordinance as
providing a benefit to property owners generally by regulating the
pernicious social and market effects of speculative residential in-
vestment, then an ordinance would likely confer both benefits and
burdens to property owners sufficient to satisfy questions of the
average reciprocity of advantage provided by the ordinance.228 In
the alternative, a court may view the ordinance as securing a social
benefit (affordable housing) for one group at the expense of an-
other group (property owners desiring to realize market gains
through sale). As Professor Edward Ziegler writes, "[w]hile owners
and others burdened by these regulatory schemes may be conven-
227. Courts have struggled to determine the appropriate segment of property affected
by a given regulation. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 330-32 (rejecting the adoption of a
categorical rule requiring compensation when regulations temporarily restrict property
development); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978)
(emphasizing the economic value remaining in the terminal building); Appolo Fuels, Inc. v.
United States, 381 E3d 1338, 1345-47 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (concluding that a mining company
retained value in leases unaffected by regulation). See generally Robert H. Freilich, Time,
Space, and Value in Inverse Condemnation: A Unified Theory for Partial Takings Analysis, 24 U.
HAw. L. REv. 589 (2002).
228. A seemingly burdensome property regulation that simultaneously confers some
benefit may provide an average reciprocity of advantage, making a takings claim inappropri-
ate. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
noted that a regulation requiring a coal company to leave pillars of coal in the mine for
workers' safety simultaneously benefited the coal company and therefore secured an average
reciprocity of advantage. Id. at 415.
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ient targets of opportunity for dealing with the problems of per-
sons with low or moderate incomes, they appear to be no more a
distinct cause of their economic plight than the butcher, the baker,
or the candlestick maker."
2 2 9
The harm of the approach in Cienega Gardens is that it dramati-
cally broadens the class of regulations subject to takings analysis.
Many regulations based on legislative determinations of overall so-
cial or public benefit create groups of people who are more or less
burdened by the regulation than other groups of people. A court
should not have to review each legislative decision to see if burdens
are "fairly" allocated through a takings analysis which involves the
balancing of many complex factors. Instead, a court's review
should be limited to identifying those cases where burdens are al-
located so "unfairly" that the legislation is a violation of due
process because it is arbitrary or not rationally related to legitimate
exercises of the local government's police power.30
V. THOUGHTS ON IMPLEMENTATION
A. Monitoring and Enforcement
Community supporters, community opponents, and politicians
are all likely to raise concerns regarding the implementation of an
anti-speculation ordinance. In some ways, merely enacting such an
ordinance conveys a significant and important message about
property relationships and the appropriate balance between public
and private interests. The enforcement of such an ordinance may
be secondary to its symbolism. This is not to suggest that the ordi-
nance be toothless. Several frameworks, all with different
advantages and disadvantages, can be used to monitor and enforce
its provisions.
In one framework, a private entity, such as the developer of the
community or a common interest community association, could
have primary responsibility for monitoring and enforcement. Re-
corded covenants could include enforceable sale restrictions. An
advantage of this approach is that a private entity such as a com-
munity association is closely situated to the housing affected by the
ordinance, and has a relatively smaller stock of housing to monitor.
229. Ziegler, supra note 211, at 14. One response to this argument may lie in further de-
veloping goals of speculation restrictions in residential housing markets beyond their
potential for maintaining affordable housing.
230. See supra notes 157-169 and accompanying text.
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Developers or members of a community association have experi-
ence in enforcing other covenant restrictions. Moreover,
community members may have a personal interest in making sure
speculation restrictions are complied with, creating effective en-
forcement incentives.
A common interest community association may, however, change
its position on speculation restrictions, especially resale restrictions,
if the gains from violating the restrictions outweigh the benefit of
maintaining the restriction. Many covenant restrictions can be
changed by majority or two-thirds vote of the association members
or its board of directors. A board may come under intense pressure
to repeal restrictions, or a community may elect board members
with that specific agenda in mind. The developer of the community
may be an insufficient check on this potential change of perspective.
While a developer has a relatively strong incentive to maintain the
image of a stable community of long-term residents during the ini-
tial sales period, a developer may not relish long-term involvement.
However, it is possible that a developer's relatively short-term interest
in a community might be tempered by the adverse impact on a de-
veloper's overall reputation that might result from accounts of
particular developments harmed by speculative activity. Further-
more, developers may view a three-year restriction as a short-term
rather than long-term commitment.
In a second framework, local government assumes primary re-
sponsibility for monitoring and enforcement. 3 ' The local
government could require that an affidavit of compliance be in-
cluded with the sales contract or other aspects of the purchase
process. A person making a false statement on the affidavit or fail-
ing to comply with the instructions of the affidavit would be subject
to civil or criminal proceedings. Local government might monitor
buyer activity through property tax payments or deed recordings.
It is possible, and not unprecedented, for state or local govern-
ment to distinguish between owner occupied and investment
housing. Nevada, for example, imposed a different cap on prop-
erty tax rate increases based on whether the property was owner
occupied property or investment property.2 ' The State distin-
guished between the two based on a postcard mailed to all
231. Government could also delegate this task to a community non-profit. For example,
the Community Law Center in Baltimore, Maryland was designated attorney general power
by the city to bring nuisance actions against offending property owners.
232. Sean Whaley, Panel Aimo to Close Tax Cap Loopholes, LAs VEGAS REv.-J., May 4, 2005,
at 5B (discussing a cap on property tax increases of three percent for owner occupied single
family homes and eight percent for investment property).
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property owners on which an owner, under penalty of perjury, in-
dicated the property's ownership status.
Although governments are currently less active in enforcing pri-
vate covenant restrictions within communities, an anti-speculation
regime would provide a new avenue for involvement. A central
premise of the anti-speculation regime is that local government
recognizes speculation as a problem worthy of more comprehen-
sive attention. Traditionally, covenants have been viewed primarily
as private agreements among developers and common interest
community residents. State and local government may legislate to
address or prevent abuses, but primary enforcement and monitor-
ing of covenants is usually a private affair. The impact of
speculation in local communities, particularly rapidly increasing
housing values, should be considered an issue of public concern.
As a result, government will face costs associated with monitoring
and enforcement. These costs can be mitigated by combining
monitoring and enforcement activity with other regulatory activi-
ties, such as tax collection and deed recordation processes.
A third framework combines public and private elements. A pri-
vate association might identify violations, or report general
information to the local government for public enforcement. A
combination of the two approaches merges the private associa-
tion's advantages of proximity and interest with the government's
potentially broader enforcement capabilities. Additionally, incor-
porating a public component could limit the association's ability to
unilaterally change the terms of the speculation restriction.
B. Renting and Homeownership
An alternative anti-speculation approach could involve owner
occupancy requirements instead of a three-year sale restriction. An
ordinance could require owner occupancy of residential housing
for a three-year period, subject to a percentage of overall units that
would be eligible to rent (but not to intentionally hold vacant).
This provision would place an obligation on the landowner similar
to the duty of the landlord to mitigate in the landlord-tenant con-
text. The owner would be required to use reasonable methods to
advertise and otherwise make the unit available for rental pur-
poses.
233. Sommer v. Kridel, 378 A.2d 767, 773 (N.J. 1977).
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An owner occupancy requirement addresses speculation in that
it deters speculators from purchasing in areas they do not intend
to live. It does not, however, prevent owner occupants from buying
and selling frequently to take advantage of significant price
increases, nor does it adequately address the speculator-disguised-
as-owner-occupant who buys and sells under the fiction of owner
occupancy. In the speculator-disguised-as-owner-occupant example,
identification costs are high. It would be necessary to determine
what actions or what time period constitutes owner occupation.
Monitoring costs are particularly high as some entity would be re-
sponsible for verifying vague and indeterminate occupancy facts.3
An anti-speculation ordinance requiring owner occupancy
forces purchasers to live in the state where they purchase property.
This requirement does not prevent purchases at the outset. Both
in-state and out-of-state individuals may freely buy property. How-
ever, the ordinance would then mandate that the purchaser move
in to the home, which requires moving to the state where the
property is located.
This requirement discriminates against nonresidents and impli-
cates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. 5 Assuming discrimination exists and that this dis-
crimination burdens one of the privileges or immunities protected
by the Clause, a local government must demonstrate a "substantial
reason" for the discrimination. 2 6 As part of the substantial reason,
a local government can demonstrate that nonresidents "constitute
a peculiar source of the evil at which the statute is aimed."237 A lo-
234. For example, entities might need to verify the length of time purchasers stayed on
the premises, whether they moved any furniture in, or whether they registered to vote in the
new jurisdiction.
235. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privi-
leges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."). A municipal level ordinance may
fall within the reach of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See United Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council v. Mayor & Council of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 214-18 (1984) (stating that a
municipality derives authority from the state and the fact that some in-state residents are
similarly affected by an ordinance limiting out-of-state residents does not confer immunity
from constitutional review). The Dormant Commerce Clause has a similar scope. See Hicklin
v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 531-32 (1978) (finding unconstitutional an Alaska law creating
preference for Alaska residents). Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, an ordinance that
is deemed nondiscriminatory against out-of-state persons is subject to a balancing test weigh-
ing the burdens of the law on interstate commerce against its benefits. See Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (striking down an Arizona statute requiring fruit
grown in Arizona to be packed within the State before export). If an ordinance is consid-
ered discriminatory, the court will consider whether the law is protectionist, and if it is, the
least restrictive means of regulation. See C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392-
93 (1994) (striking down a town ordinance requiring solid waste to be processed at town
transfer station).
236. United Bldg., 465 U.S. at 222.
237. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 398 (1948).
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cal government enacting anti-speculation measures can cite hous-
ing affordability concerns, evidence of vacant housing purchased
by speculators remaining unrented, and a need to preserve the
residential community character of neighborhoods as reasons for
the measures. The latter need for protection of community charac-
ter may be a particularly strong argument given that it is a key
element of a local government's traditional land use regulatory
role.
A weakness of the owner occupancy approach, but less of a prob-
lem for the three-year resale limitation approach, is the perception
of the ordinance as a veiled attempt by more affluent, owner occu-
pied neighborhoods to exclude lower income renters. Policies
curbing speculation could be viewed as anti-rental.2 38 Certainly
renters could be long-term residents of communities. An ordi-
nance limiting the resale of homes does not necessarily require
owner occupancy throughout the limitation period. Owners would
retain the ability to rent the property, and this could provide a
valuable source of affordable rental housing. Nevertheless, propo-
nents of a resale limitation need to be attentive to these concerns.
Although a restriction on resale may limit rampant, uncon-
trolled price appreciation in some housing markets, it is not clear
what effect such an approach would have on the overall supply of
affordable housing. For example, would such a policy increase or
decrease the supply of housing that filters down from higher to
lower income families?2 39 Would an anti-speculation ordinance, as
additional housing regulation in the jurisdiction, contribute to in-
creasing housing prices? Would a resale restriction limit
opportunities for new buyers to purchase houses for occupancy?
Those investors purchasing homes and renting them would be
temporarily restricted in their ability to sell, even at a premium, to
other purchasers intending to live in the homes themselves. An
owner occupancy restriction would address this possibility, but raise
other concerns.
238. See Keenan, supra note 63, at 111 (noting anti-rental clauses in condominium dec-
larations limit overall supply of rental housing and, consequently, raise rents). The literature
on community and municipal efforts to exclude lower income residents through land use
regulations is voluminous. See generally Henry A. Span, How the Courts Should Fight Exclusionary
Zoning, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (2001); CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE,
SPACE, AND AUDACIOUS JUDGES (1996). To the extent anti-speculation measures limit the
supply of rental housing, a city could provide rental opportunities by lottery but lotteries
carry limitations. See Carol Necole Brown, Casting Lots: The Illusion ofJustice and Accountability
in Property Allocation, 53 BUFF. L. REv. 65, 73 (2005) (finding that a lottery system "frequently
results in unjust distributions of property [and] obscures the decision to avoid making diffi-
cult choices").
239. See generally C. Tsuriel et a., Dynamics of Affordable Housing Stock: Microdata Analysis
of Filtering, 12J. HOUSING RES. 115 (2001).
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Lastly, an effective approach to providing affordable housing re-
quires attention to both promoting homeownership for low
income families as well as promoting affordable rental opportuni-
ties for those families who still need access to shelter but cannot
afford to be homeowners. An anti-speculation ordinance would
likely benefit potential homeowner households at, or just below,
the median area income who are adversely affected by rising hous-
ing prices. Lower income households will still require more
targeted subsidy programs to create rental and ownership oppor-
tunities. Anti-speculation measures should be used in conjunction
with existing subsidy programs, such as the Low Income Housing
Tax Credit program, that may address the needs of residents at
lower income levels.'4 The argument for an anti-speculation ordi-
nance does not address what the appropriate ratio of homeowners
to renters in a particular neighborhood should be, nor does the
argument necessarily value homeownership and the contributions
of homeowners to communities more than renters and their con-.- • 241
tributions.
C. Public and Private Agreements
The discussion of an anti-speculation ordinance thus far has
centered on the challenges and effects of government regulation
to combat speculation. The government could also obtain similar
anti-speculation benefits through negotiated development agree-
ments. In exchange for density bonuses and related incentives,
240. The Low Income Housing Tax Credit program (LIHTC) is codified at I.R.C. § 42.
The LIHTC awards tax credits to owners of newly constructed or rehabilitated rental prop-
erties meeting certain affordable housing standards. I.R.C. § 42(g) (1) (2000).
241. See, e.g., Donald R. Haurin et al., The Impact of Neighborhood Homeoumership Rates: A
Review of the Theoretical and Empirical Literature, 13J. HOUSING RES. 119, 144 (2002) (finding
that relatively few studies exist on how homeownership affects the behavior of individuals
living in, and near to, a particular community); Joseph Harkness & Sandra J. Newman,
Homeownership for the Poor in Distressed Neighborhood: Does This Make Sense?, 13 HOUSING POL'Y
DEBATE 597, 598 (2002) (comparing benefits of homeownership in distressed and stable
neighborhoods).
242. Development agreements typically provide developers regulatory certainty protect-
ing the significant time and monetary investment put into a new project that unfolds over
many years. Development agreements also permit local governments to extract more bene-
fits from developers than might otherwise be lawfully permitted. For discussions of
development agreements generally, see DAVID L. CALLIES ET AL., BARGAINING FOR DEVEL-
OPMENT: A HANDBOOK ON DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS, ANNEXATION AGREEMENTS, LAND
DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS, VESTED RIGHTS, AND THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC FACILITIES 91
(2003); Michael H. Crew, Development Agreements After Nollan v. California Coastal Commis-
sion, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), 22 URB. LAw 23, 27-31 (1990); John J. Delaney, Development
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developers could agree to include resale restrictions within sales
contracts in new developments. Ostensibly, the developer would
then be responsible for monitoring and enforcing the restrictions,
and the local government could use the terms of the development
agreement to monitor the developer's compliance.
Development agreements present the opportunity to address
speculation using a methodology that embraces private market
principles. To be successful, an anti-speculation measure must
resonate with individual interests or with private property rhetoric
and ideals such as the preservation of residential community char-
acter and community stability. Gerald Frug notes that suburban
communities have been much more successful than cities in avoid-
ing accusations of acting in manners inimical to individual
property rights."' Suburban governments are often viewed as pro-
tectors or enhancers of individual property rights. Common
interest communities, despite their myriad of rules and restrictions,
also successfully appropriate private values of "home and family,
private property, and community solidarity."44
Development agreements allow local governments and develop-
ers to contract for their specific interests. The advantage of using
development agreements to implement anti-speculation measures
is that the measures can presumably be tailored to address the spe-
cific needs of each new development. Moreover, a city's use of
development agreements to implement anti-speculation measures
reflects that city's conclusion that speculation is harmful without
committing the city to pass binding (and perhaps overly rigid) leg-
islation to implement that view. The disadvantage of relying on
development agreements is that since each agreement is separately
negotiated, cities may be inconsistent in their inclusion of anti-
speculation measures due to pressure by developers or other con-
stituencies. This could give rise to a legal claim similar to that in
Gangemi.
245
Alternatively, neighborhood-based or interest-group organiza-
tions could negotiate a similar agreement with developers in
return for support of the developer's project through the land use
approval process. Grassroots community economic development
Agreements: The Road from Prohibition to "Let's Make a Deal!," 25 URB. LAw. 49 (1993); Judith
Welch Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning, Development Agreements,
and the Theoretical Foundations of Government Land Use Deals, 65 N.C. L. RFv. 957, 1000-03
(1987).
243. GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING
WALLS 56-58 (1999).
244. Id. at 59.
245. See supra notes 176-180 and accompanying text.
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organizations negotiated an enforceable community benefits
agreement with developers in the Figueroa Corridor in Los Ange-
les promising affordable housing, jobs, and other benefits. 2 4 6 In the
context of speculation, community groups could require that a de-
veloper include resale restrictions in new development as a
condition of that community's support of the project.21
7
The terms of an anti-speculation development agreement be-
tween a local government and a developer might be outside the
scope of ajurisdiction's police power. Some local governments may
be able to enter into these sorts of agreements because of state
provisions giving local jurisdictions the power to adopt procedures
24and requirements concerning development agreements.48 Other
local governments could rely on broad provisions contained in
statutes like Hawaii's, which states that "[t]he development agree-
ment also may cover any other matter not inconsistent with this
chapter, nor prohibited by law. 249 Finally, a statute may contain
more detailed language. Washington's statute includes a number
of "development standards" that may be incorporated in develop-
ment agreements. Anti-speculation provisions arguably fall within
250 251provisions governing permitted uses, affordable housing, or
"[a]ny other appropriate development requirement or proce-
dure,,252
VI. CONCLUSION
At first glance, the idea of local governments regulating the re-
sale of property may appear rather fanciful. The free alienation of
property is commonly deemed an essential component of property
ownership that would likely not be surrendered casually. In addi-
246. Scott L. Cummings, Community Economic Development as Progressive Politics: Towards a
Grassroots Movement for Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L. REv. 399, 480 (2001) (critiquing market-
based community economic development theory and describing alternative examples of
legal advocacy and community organizing).
247. Community groups often have political and legal leverage in the land use approval
process. Land use decision makers are sensitive to the concerns of their electorate. Also,
some land use regulations require community participation. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 163.3181 (West 2000) (requiring community participation in the comprehensive planning
process). An unsatisfied community organization can create delays in the approval process,
which can cost a developer significant amounts of money or possibly prevent the completion
of the project altogether.
248. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3223 (West 2000).
249. HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-126(c) (2003).
250. WASH. REv. CODE § 36.70B.170(3) (a) (2003).
251. Id. at (3)(e).
252. Id. at (3)(j).
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tion, exceptions to an anti-speculation measure threaten to swallow
the rule as local governments would face understandable pressure
to approve individual or categorical exceptions to the application
of the ordinance for hardship and similar unforeseen occurrences.
The number of people entitled to exceptions could outnumber
those not entitled to exceptions, and the administrative burden of
identifying bona fide cases for exception could be overwhelming
and threaten to outweigh the benefits of the legislation.
A local government's failure to address the effects of speculation
through public regulation, however, is not costless. Unregulated
speculation imposes economic and social costs on families search-
ing for affordable housing, places the long-term stability of
residential communities at risk, and reinforces the primacy of an
unfettered market conception of property over other conceptions
of property reflecting social and community values. An anti-
speculation ordinance recognizes that a person's home is more
than just another market instrument to be bartered, leveraged and
hedged. Real property serves a much deeper purpose in our com-
munity. It provides shelter for individuals and families and it
constitutes neighborhoods with identities and history. These char-
acteristics of real property are intuitively felt by many, but often
forgotten in individualistic pursuits of profit within speculation
frenzies. A responsible vision of local government would respond
to this tension between individual pursuit and collective good by
adopting measures that recognize the unique, special status of
homes.
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